Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1992

Marcus P. Randolph v. Mary E. Randolph : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ephraim H. Fankhauser; Attorney for Defendant/Appellant;.
Kellie F. Williams; Corporon & Williams; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Randolph v. Randolph, No. 920623 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/3590

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

E^lis^F

UTAH
DOCUMENT
K FU

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARCUS P. RANDOLPH,
Plaintiff/Appellee, and
Cross-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 920623-CA

MARY E. RANDOLPH,
Defendant/Appellee, and
Cross-Appellee.

Priority No. l5"

BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT'S SUPPLEMENTAL AND
JUDGMENT DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED ON OR ABOUT AUGUST 21, 1992,
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESIDING.

E. H. FANKHAUSER
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

FILED
KELLIE F . WILLIAMS •^•"7 f t f A D D e a ls
CORPORON & W I L L r ^ C 0 U r t ° f A P P
310 S o u t h Main S t r e e t
S u i t e 1400
A\I 1 1 1
S a l t Lake C i t y , uK/tf 8 4 1 0

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MaryT.Noonan
Clerk of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARCUS P. RANDOLPH,
Plaintiff/Appellee, and
Cross-Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 920623-CA

MARY E. RANDOLPH,
Defendant/Appellee, and
Cross-Appellee.

Priority No. 15"

BRIEF OF APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT

AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT'S SUPPLEMENTAL AND
JUDGMENT DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED ON OR ABOUT AUGUST 21, 1992,
THE HONORABLE JUDGE JAMES S. SAWAYA, PRESIDING.

E. H. FANKHAUSER
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
KELLIE F. WILLIAMS
CORPORON & WILLIAMS
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

l
ii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND DETERMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS. STATUTES OR APPT.Tf!ART.E CASES.
. . . .
STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

4

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

6

ARGUMENT
I.

15

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING
TO EQUALLY DIVIDE THE PARTIES/ DEBTS AND/OR THE MARITAL
ASSETS GIVEN THE LEVEL OF ALIMONY AWARDED.
15

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING
THE PLAINTIFF TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE COSTS OF PRIVATE SCHOOL
IN ADDITION TO THE AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT. ONE-HALF OF
SCHOOL RELATED OR WORK RELATED DAY CARE. AND 60% (SIXTY
PERCENT^ OF THE MEDICAL EXPENSES.
19
III.THE TRIAL ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE
PLAINTIFF TO MAINTAIN LIFE INSURANCE WHICH NAMED THE
DEFENDANT AS BENEFICIARY AND IN DOING SO IN EXCESS OF THE
ALIMONY AWARD
23
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION RE; CHILD
CUSTODY
24
V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN THE AWARD
OF ALIMONY.
27

VI. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION OR ERR IN
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES.
32
CONCLUSION

36

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

37

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Asper v. Asper. 753 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah App. 1988)

32

Baashaw v. Bagshaw. 788 P.2d 1057, 1061 (Utah App. 1990)

. .

35

Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987)

18

Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1172 (Utah App. 1990)

17

Dunn v. Dunnr 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990)

2, 18

Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989)

27

Hogge v. Hogge. 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982)

26, 27

Howells v. Howells. 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991)

31

Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982)

3, 26

In re Marriage of Stern, 789 P.2d 807 (Wash. App. 1990) . . 2, 22
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985)

29

Maughn v. Maughn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989)

3, 26

Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990)

3, 26

Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1991)

. . . .

35

Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 118 (Utah App. 1990)

18

Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987) . . . .

17

Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah App. 1990) .
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)
Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1989)
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982)

ii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30, 35
3
30
2, 19

Statutes
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5

23

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1)

2, 3

Utah Code Ann. §30-3-10

3, 25

Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1992)
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7, et. seq
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.2

1
2, 19, 20
20

iii
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1992) which
provides:

"The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,

including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over, . . .
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but
division,

child

not

limited

custody,

to, divorce, annulment, property

support, visitation,

adoption,

and

paternity . . . ."
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The matter below is a divorce action and this appeal is from
the final Supplemental Decree of Divorce and certain provisions of
that Decree of Divorce, heard by the Third Judicial District Court,
and the issues raised by the Cross-Appellant regarding those
provisions within the Supplemental Decree of Divorce, which did not
equally divide the marital debts or equally divide the marital
assets, and which ordered the Plaintiff to pay one-half of the cost
of private school in addition to child support and day care
expenses, and which ordered Plaintiff to maintain life insurance,
naming Defendant as beneficiary, in excess of the alimony award.
Further, this is an appeal from the Order on Commissioner's
Recommendation, entered on or about June 23, 1992, which denied
1
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^

Plaintiff's motion to set aside his stipulation regarding child
custody.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND DETERMATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES OR APPLICABLE CASES,
The following are the issues presented on appeal by the
Plaintiff herein:
1.

Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in

failing to equally divide the marital debts and in failing to
equally divide the marital assets? Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1), Dunn
v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah App. 1990), Woodward v. Woodward, 656
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982).
2.

Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in

ordering the Plaintiff to pay one-half of the cost of private
school in addition to the award of child support and one-half of
the cost of school-related day care expenses? Utah Code Ann. §7845-7, et. seq., In re Marriage of Stern, 789 P.2d 807 (Wash. App.
1990) .
3.

Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in

ordering the Plaintiff to maintain life insurance which named
Defendant as beneficiary in excess of the alimony award? Utah Code
Ann. §30-3-5(1).
4.

Did the trial court err or abuse its discretion in

denying Plaintiff's motion to set aside the stipulation regarding
2
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

chi I(1 -ustc'3\ 7 Utah Code Ann. H30 - \ -i-. u

'tan Code Ann.

Moon v. Moi,
p

"-

J

'f

^

i,

nauahn v. Maughn, 770

'

••

Hutchison v. Hutchison f

649 P. 2d 3 8

(Utah 1982) .
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The s t a n d a r d of

r e v i e w on iipfio. Il

d i s c r e t i o n , - landai'd
d i s c r e t i o n and s o
confines

-*

Ionq a s t h a i

issues.

The t r i a l

discretion

.

d e c i s i o n ur<

-et

mu ;-,o . jnq a s --•
iii:: 1 -

forth
» ,

-

facts

c o u r t h a s broad
i

r n n r * it

iF,:,n • , t m.

u

: s

rui r e a s o n s f o r t h e
.

u,uui .. s h o u l d

in i
disturb

the

order.

The a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s h o u l d r e v i e w tin 1 l i i r t i i a l
t:i ::i a Il jn idg€ n in I ::i< ; i

t h e r e v i e w ^<~mrf

>*- * * -

nc

.:
"4 >

.:

1 indiin» .

I: .1 n ; ' " '! s i ear J > e r r o n e o u s " s t a n d a r d .

" c l e a r l y e r r o n e o u s " when " a l t h o u g h t h e r e

Walker

ibuse of

p annpii^f^

; <ii

corn l u s i . , ,

i _> „i

i s o x e r c i s e d w±u

* :«

o! t h e S t a ; -

resulting

a: t o . i l l

I I i , i ,i!,e

;

-ti:^

-\/

I I lie

A t i ndlnq

- n d e n c e t o support

•

n i s t a k e has been c o m m i t t e d . "
<

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

it,

> mite
State v.

is

^

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the final Supplemental Judgment and
Decree of Divorce, entered by the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S.
Sawaya, presiding, which, among other things, entered orders
regarding the division of debt, division of marital assets, payment
of child support, payment of private school costs, maintenance of
life insurance, payment of alimony and attorney7s fees.

The

Supplemental Decree of Divorce from which the Defendant appealed
and Plaintiff cross-appealed was signed and entered by the Third
District Court on August 21, 1992. A Notice of Appeal was filed by
Defendant and a timely Notice of Appeal was filed by Plaintiff on
or about October 2, 1992.
This appeal is also from a final order entitled Order on
Commissioner's Recommendations, dated June 23, 1992, which order
denied the Plaintiff's motion to withdraw his stipulation regarding
custody of the minor children.
The

Plaintiff

filed

for

divorce

Responsive pleadings were filed.

in

the

lower

court.

There was a bifurcation of the

divorce proceedings, and a Decree of Divorce was awarded on
February 18, 1992.

All issues attendant to the divorce came on

regularly for trial on March 24, 1992. The court took the matter
under advisement and on June 22, 1992, at the hour of 11:30 a.m.,
4
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ustody
-
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siiuiHi 3

1

Recommendation

and final Supplemental

appellee

filed

has

a

Supplemental

Findings

Supplemental

Decree

of

timely
of

Decree of Divorce, the

cross-appeal

Fact

Divorce

herein.

and

Conclusions

and

Order

on

of

(Said
Law

and

Commissioner's

Recommendations are attached hereto, designated as Addendum "A",
Addendum "B" and Addendum "C" respectively,)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married to each other in May, 1977 (TR, p. 3,
11. 21 and 22.) The parties have two children born as their issue,
Kira, who was age 10 at the time of trial, and Erika, who was age
5 at the time of trial (TR, p. 4, 11. 1-4). The parties separated
in June of 1991 (TR, p. 4, 11. 5-7).
The parties stipulated to physical custody in Defendant at the
time of trial (TR, p. 4, 11. 15-57).
Plaintiff was employed by Kennecott Corporation at the time of
trial and testified regarding his base salary and the fact that he
received commissions which varied each year.

(See TR, pp. 12-21.)

His 1992 income, as testified to at trial, was $114,500.00 (One
Hundred Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars), which included a
substantial bonus of $14,500.00 (Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred
Dollars).

(See TR, p. 18, 11. 21-32, TR. , p. 21, 11. 18-24.)

Based upon that annual income, the Plaintiff offered to pay child
6
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The Defendant worked

o

. ,

One

iv ot that exhibit

• •. * .

jifferent jobs aur

»#
. J:he r-arriacre,

including running a day care center 01 it of ^ h ^ parties' ! ^m* •
1988 to

iQ'«'»,i! „"i«i^

primary

wage

|,

•

earner

and

\
J

enrolled at; the Univers* *f v <^
I"

-

: 'i,

I

was pursuing

* ;:

~t'<r

Elementary

graduation '<*m within three vonv*
& wnni

: bu

•

i

-u-vi

., •

-i*.-

Educai i

!i Ldi

»r= expected

(See TR,

" > -c-

•

t\

111

01 , :.u iu , . .iuv.j:
<

:

pursue a Masters Degree, which

•

years from Marcr,

was

n| 1 h« 1

would take an additional *wo --ears.
and

defendant

.; « Uie time u

1 oegree

the

^fendant

'

tesl mi n-..

vr<

1

.n.i, process * *• * * Masters ir i ve

' ru

matter was tried before Judge

Sawaya
Defendant testified that with the classes that she had left to
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that
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^

(

teaching certificate if she took two classes per quarter, in three
years. (See TR, p. 182, 11, 21-25, p.183, 11. 1-10.)

Again, she

further indicated that she would have her Masters in an additional
two years. (See TR., p. 183, 11. 11-16.)
When questioned about her health, the Defendant testified that
she did not agree that there was any concern about her health
problems impacting on her ability to function as a mother and
single parent. (See TR. , p. 148, 11. 14-20.)

She indicated that

with her medication, her medical condition was controlled.

(TR, p.

186, 1. 25, p. 187, 11. 1-7.)
Defendant testified further, as follows:
Q

But you definitely plan on graduating in five

years with a master's?
A

Yes.

Q

And entering the work force at that time?

A

Yes.

(TR, p. 186.)
Defendant testified at the time of trial that her monthly
expenses were $3,198.00 (Three Thousand One Hundred Ninety Eight
Dollars),

and

she

submitted

an

exhibit

setting

expenses.

A copy of that exhibit is attached hereto as Addendum

"E".
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as

•».

i

i

Plaintiff's Exhibit "7", a copy of which is attached hereto as
Addendum "F".

<

The parties had previously divided their other assets and
property, and the only asset, other than retirement and IRAs, was
the item referred to as the "Troy Receivable" which was explained
to the court as follows:
THE COURT: Let me see if I understand before we go
too far and I lose track of this—they receive payments
on a sale of a piece of property?
MS. WILLIAMS:

Property in Troy, Montana, it has

over a fourteen thousand, five hundred balance. It pays
out at the rate of two hundred dollars a month and his
offer is that she receive that asset so that she can
receive that two hundred per month income.
Q

This income is expected to be received for

another eight or nine years—there;s no balloon due on
it?
A

No.

Q

And based upon your allocation of earnings that

would be your proposal?
A

Yes, it is.

TR, p. 26, 11. 7-20.
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When
Defendant

the parties
had

received

Thousand Dollars).

separated, they
approximately

sold

their

$25,000.00

house and

(Twenty-Five

(See TR, p. 38, 11. 8-18.)

At the time of trial, Plaintiff testified that there existed
two remaining marital debts. A debt for $7,500.00 (Seven Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars), representing a loan taken out by him to
cover

marital

expenses

incurred

and

a

tax

obligation

of

approximately $4,300.00 (Four Thousand Three Hundred Dollars).
(See TR, p. 31, 1. 25, p. 32, 11. 1-11.)

The Defendant did not

dispute the existence of those debts in her testimony.
Upon review of the transcript of trial, Plaintiff can find no
request or testimony by Defendant regarding life insurance naming
her as beneficiary.
At the time of trial, Defendant testified that the initial
$1,500.00 (One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) that she paid as a
retainer for attorney's fees for her counsel came from joint
marital funds.

(See TR, p. 171, 11. 6-11.) Counsel for Defendant

was sworn and testified that his attorney's fees were approximately
$4,300.00 (Four Thousand Three Hundred Dollars), but was unspecific
as to any expenses or costs incurred and had no statement or bill
to verify any costs or his testimony regarding fees.
20, 11. 233-25, p. 201, p. 202, 11. 1-19.)

11
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(See TR, p.

At the close of trial, the court took the matter under
advisement, indicating that the court clerk would provide counsel
with a written list of issues to be addressed by Plaintiff's
counsel and Defendant's counsel, in writing in lieu of closing
arguments.

(See TR, p. 213, 11. 9-25, p. 214, 11. 1-24.) No such

written list of issues was presented to either counsel, and the
court set the matter for hearing on June 22, 1992, at the hour of
11:30 a.m., at which time the court informed Plaintiff's counsel
and Defendant's counsel of the court's decision on the matters
under

advisement.

The

Supplemental

Decree

of

Divorce

and

Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were signed
and entered by the court on or about August 21, 1992.
Prior to the June 22, 1992 hearing in chambers, however, and
prior to the court making its decision and findings and after the
divorce trial on March 24, 1992, the Plaintiff filed a Verified
Motion to Withdraw Stipulation of Plaintiff. That motion was filed
on or about April 17, 1992, and requested that Plaintiff be
permitted to withdraw his stipulation relating to physical custody
of the minor children.

(A copy of that motion is appended hereto

and designated as Addendum "G".)

Subsequent to the Defendant's

reply to the Plaintiff's motion, the matter came on for hearing
before the Honorable

Sandra N. Peuler, Third

Commissioner, on May 22, 1992.

District Court

The Commissioner recommended the
12
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denial of Plaintiff's motion.

Plaintiff filed a timely Objection

to the Commissioner's Recommendation and a Request for Hearing was
made.

The lower court denied hearing and, by Minute Entry, dated

July 16, 1992, denied Plaintiff's motion.

That Minute Entry

adopted the Order on Commissioner's Recommendations, which was
signed by the court and entered by the court as a final order on
June 23, 1992, and which contents were further contained in the
Supplemental

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law

and

Supplemental Decree of Divorce, which awards Defendant the physical
care, custody and control of the minor children.

In addition,

within the Supplemental Decree and Findings of Fact, the court
awarded the sole legal custody of the children to Defendant,
subject to Plaintiff's specified rights of visitation (FOF 1, Index
248).

Further, the court ordered the Plaintiff to pay child

support in the sum of $1,361.00 (One Thousand Three Hundred Sixty
One Dollars) per month (FOF 3, Index 250).

The court acknowledged

that the Defendant was currently unemployed and was pursuing a
college degree and that no income should be imputed to her (FOF 3,
Index 250). In addition, the court ordered the Plaintiff to pay
Defendant one-half of all day care expenses paid by Defendant while
she was working or attending classes at an accredited educational
institution (FOF 4, Index 250).

Further, the court ordered the

Plaintiff to pay 50% (fifty percent) or one-half of the cost of
13
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private school tuition through high school, which sum was to be in
addition to base child support (FOF 4, Index 250).
The court ordered Plaintiff to maintain a life insurance
policy naming the minor children as beneficiaries in the base sum
of

$100,000.00

(One Hundred Thousand

Dollars).

In addition

thereto, the court ordered the Plaintiff to maintain a $100,000.00
(One Hundred Thousand Dollar) life insurance policy during the
period in which alimony is paid by Plaintiff to Defendant naming
Defendant as beneficiary (FOF 8, Index 251).
The court found, as well, that based upon the Plaintiffs
income and based upon the Defendant's pursuit of her educational
degree and considering her prior health conditions and her ability
to support herself at the end of the educational term, that it was
reasonable that the Plaintiff pay alimony to the Defendant at the
rate of $1,500.00 (One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) per month for
a period of 24 (twenty four) months, commencing June 1, 1992. The
court further ordered that the alimony would reduce to the sum of
$1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars) per month for an additional 24
(twenty four) months and terminate at the end of the four (4) year
period.

(FOF 10, Index 252.)

The court also found that it was reasonable that the Defendant
be awarded the "Troy Receivable," for an additional $200.00
Hundred Dollars) per month. (FOF 14, Index 253.)
14
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(Two

The court also found that it was reasonable that Plaintiff
should pay the two debts testified to which were the RediCredit
debt of $7,500.00 (Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) and the
1991 tax obligation. (FOF 17, Index 254.)
The court, lastly, found that Plaintiff should contribute the
further sum of $1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars) to the Defendant's
attorney's fees and costs incurred. (FOF 19, Index 254.)
The Defendant filed her appeal to the Supplemental Decree of
Divorce, appealing the amount and term of alimony and the award of
attorney's

fees.

The

Plaintiff

cross-appealed

from

the

Supplemental Decree of Divorce on the division of debts, payment of
private schooling

for the minor children, the obligation of

Plaintiff to maintain life insurance for Defendant, and the post
trial ruling and denial of Plaintiff's motion to withdraw or set
aside his stipulation to child custody.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
FAILING TO EQUALLY DIVIDE THE PARTIES' DEBTS AND/OR
THE MARITAL ASSETS GIVEN THE LEVEL OF ALIMONY
AWARDED.

As noted in the Statement of Facts, the parties sold their
marital residence prior to the time of trial and divided the equity
between them.

The Defendant received slightly more than did
15
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Plaintiff, and

received

Thousand Dollars).

approximately

$25,000.00

(See TR, p. 38, 11. 8-18.)

(Twenty-Five

The only other

assets of the parties were their IRAs and retirements and the "Troy
Receivable."

The court found that it was reasonable to equally

divide all IRAs and retirements that had accrued during the marital
period (FOF 16, Index 253).
The "Troy Receivable" was from the sale of the parties'
property in Troy, Montana, a different property than the marital
residence, and there was a balance owing to the parties of over
$14,500.00 (Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars), payable at
$200.00 (Two Hundred Dollars) per month (TR, p. 28, 11. 7-20).
Plaintiff offered that receivable to Defendant to assist her in
lieu of further alimony, when the offer was made at the time of
trial to pay alimony at the rate of $1,100.00 (One Thousand One
Hundred Dollars) per month (TR, p. 25, 11. 1-25, p. 26, 11. 1-3,
and also Addendum "F").

However, the Plaintiff also requested that

there be an equal division of the marital debts, which included a
debt of approximately

$7,500.00

(Seven Thousand

Five Hundred

Dollars), representing a loan taken out by Plaintiff to cover
marital expenses and a tax obligation owing by the parties of
approximately $4,300.00 (Four Thousand Three Hundred Dollars) (TR,
p. 31, 1. 25, p. 32, 11. 1-11).
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While the court equally divided the retirements, and the
parties had previously equally divided the proceeds from the
marital residence, the court then awarded $1,500.00 (One Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars) in alimony, awarded the Defendant the entire
asset known as the "Troy Receivable", at a value of $14,500.00
(Fourteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars), and ordered the Plaintiff
to pay the debts and obligations which totaled approximately
$11,800.00 (Eleven Thousand Eight Hundred Dollars). The court made
this inequitable division of the assets and debts, without issuing
findings or statements as to the reasonableness of that inequitable
division.
In dividing marital assets, "the overriding consideration is
that the ultimate division be equitable — that property be fairly
divided between the parties given their contributions during the
marriage and their circumstances at the time of divorce." Newmeyer
v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987).

"Each party is

presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and
50% of the marital property."
(Utah App. 1990).

The court must issue sufficient findings to

demonstrate an award otherwise.
It

is

Burt v. Burt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1172

acknowledged

Id.

that

"the

trial

court

is

allowed

considerable discretion in the division of marital property, so
long

as it exercises

its discretion
17
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1

standards set by this state7s appellate courts." Dunn v. Dunn, 802
P.2d 1314, 1322 (Utah App. 1990), citing Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d
118 (Utah App. 1990).

The court in Dunn set forth various factors

for the trial court to consider in fashioning an equitable property
division and articulated those factors as follows:
The amount and kind of property to be divided; whether
the property was acquired before or during the marriage;
the source of the property; the health of the parties;
the parties7 standard of living, respective financial
conditions, needs and earning capacity; the duration of
the marriage; the children of the marriage; the parties7
ages at the time of the marriage and of divorce; what the
parties gave up by the marriage; and the necessary
relationship the property division has with the amount of
alimony and child support to be awarded.
Dunn, at 1322, citing Burke v. Burke. 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah
1987).
In the instant case, the court did not issue any findings
regarding why the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay all of the
outstanding debt and Defendant be awarded the entirety of the asset
known as the "Troy Receivable" of $14,500.00 (Fourteen Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars).

In the instant matter, after payment of

child support and the award of alimony of $1,500.00 (One Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars), the Defendant had monthly income to her of
$2,861.00 (Two Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty One Dollars). She also
had equal division of the other marital cash and retirement assets.
Given the fairly equivalent net income then available to the
parties, it was neither fair nor equitable to not equally divide
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the assets and debts. As in the case of Woodward v. Woodward, 656
P.2d 431 (Utah 1982), the court should find that an equitable
division

is

a

one-half

share

of

accrued

marital

assets.

Admittedly, the Woodward case was referring to retirement assets,
however, the concept and spirit of the case of Woodward v.
Woodward. is that each party should receive 50% (fifty percent) of
those assets acquired during the marriage, barring some unusual
circumstance.

Likewise, equity requires that if the parties are

sharing the income received by the wage earner, that there should
be some sharing of the marital debts.

The trial court abused its

discretion in awarding the Defendant $1,500.00 (One Thousand Five
Hundred Dollars) in alimony, while failing to then divide the "Troy
Receivable" and the marital debts.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING THE PLAINTIFF TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE COSTS OF
PRIVATE SCHOOL IN ADDITION TO THE AWARD OF CHILD SUPPORT,
ONE-HALF OF SCHOOL RELATED OR WORK RELATED DAY CARE, AND
60% (SIXTY PERCENT) OF THE MEDICAL EXPENSES.

The Plaintiff submits that the trial erred and abused its
discretion in failing to comply with Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7, et.
seq.

The Uniform Civil Liabilities for Support Act specifically

provides a child support obligation table, which table was used in
the instant matter to calculate the appropriate level of support.
(See Addendum "F".)

In the instant matter, the court found that
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the appropriate level of child support was $1,361.00 (One Thousand
Three Hundred Sixty One Dollars) pursuant to the guidelines.
3, Index 250.)

(FOF

The trial court also found that it was reasonable

that the Defendant be paid one-half of all day care expenses
incurred while she was working or attending classes. (FOF 4, Index
250.) In addition, the court found that it was fair and equitable
that Plaintiff pay 60% (sixty percent) of non-routine medical
expenses not covered by insurance (FOF 7, Index 251).
Each of the foregoing provisions are contemplated and provided
for within §78-45-7, Utah Code Ann.

However, the Child Support

Guidelines, as they have come to be known, are presumptive, even
though that presumption can be rebutted if the court awards an
amount different than the guideline amount.
45-7.2.)

(Utah Code Ann. §78-

The foregoing provision requires that a written finding

or specific finding on the record support the conclusion that
complying with the Guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate or not
in the best interests of the child in a particular case, if the
Guidelines are to be rebutted. (§78-45-7.2[3].)
In the instant case, there was no specific finding that it was
appropriate to deviate from the Guidelines or that the Guidelines
were rebutted.

In addition, given the fact that the Guidelines

specifically provide for the calculation of base child support
(§78-45-7.14), specifically provide for the sharing of medical and
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dental expenses

(§78-45-7.15), and the sharing of child care

expenses (§78-45-7.16), it is apparent that to award support in
addition to the foregoing is contrary to the Guidelines, and would
require a rebuttal of the Guidelines and a specific finding and
reason therefore.
In the instant case, the court, in addition to the awards set
forth above, ordered the Plaintiff to pay one-half of all costs of
private school tuition through high school. (FOF 4, Index 250.)
Again, it is Plaintiff's contention that the Finding and Order is
in error in that it does not comply with §78-45-7, and is support
in addition thereto, and was not supported by the evidence adduced
at trial.

While Defendant testified that it was her desire that

the court order the Plaintiff to pay one-half of private school
costs (See TR, p. 140, 11. 6-8), the Plaintiff contested that
request and specifically testified that the support award that he
was offering adequately covered and met the needs of the children,
including the cost of private school (See TR, p. 22, 11. 18-25, p.
23, 11. 1-7).

The trial court made no findings that the child

support was inadequate, and that the court should then deviate from
the Guidelines and award support on top of the support set forth in
§78-45-7.

Plaintiff would submit that since the legislature

provides explicitly for awards of medical expenses and day care,
that the legislature must have intended for all other costs and
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expenses attendant to the needs of the child or children to be
covered by the Guideline table.
There are no cases in Utah on point.

However, the Court of

Appeals in Washington has addressed this issue in the case of In re
Marriage of Stern. 789 P. 2d 807 (Wash. App. 1990).

In that matter,

the husband had been ordered to pay and contribute to the costs of
private school tuition.

In that case, the court found that there

were no findings regarding the children's need for a private
education or any findings that there would be a benefit that would
inure to the children from attending a private school that would
not inure to them from attending a public one.

Because of that,

the court found that the trial court had exceeded the limits of its
discretion.

Id. at 813, 814.

(A copy of In re Marriage of Stern

is attached as Addendum "H".)
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that the court abused
its discretion and erred in ordering the Plaintiff to bear one-half
of the cost of private schooling in addition to payment of day
care, medical expenses and base child support of $1,361.00 (One
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty One Dollars) per month.
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III. THE TRIAL ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ORDERING THE
PLAINTIFF TO MAINTAIN LIFE INSURANCE WHICH NAMED THE
DEFENDANT AS BENEFICIARY AND IN DOING SO IN EXCESS OF THE
ALIMONY AWARDED.
The trial court awarded alimony in the sum of $1,500.00 (One
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) per month, for a period of two (2)
years, then reducing to $1,000.00 (One Thousand Dollars) per month
for an additional two (2) years.

(FOF 10, Index 252.)

of that sum is $60,000.00 (Sixty Thousand Dollars).
court

found that

it was reasonable

The total
The trial

that Plaintiff maintain a

$100,000.00 (One Hundred Thousand Dollar) life insurance policy
during

the

period

in which

alimony

is

paid

by

Plaintiff

to

Defendant, naming Defendant as beneficiary (FOF 8, Index 251). It
is apparent that the amount ordered to be maintained is unjustified
and not supported by the fact of the court's own order relating to
alimony.

Further, and of greater importance, is the fact that the

court entered this order without evidence before it justifying the
award.

Utah Code Ann. §3 0-3-5, governs the right of the court to

make equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or
obligations and the parties. However, the award must be based upon
the facts presented at the time of trial and based upon the needs
and equities.
to

the

reason

In the instant case, the court made no findings as
that

it was

ordering

$100,000.00

(One

Hundred

Thousand Dollar) life insurance policy to be maintained, when the
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total alimony award was $60,000.00 (Sixty Thousand Dollars). There
was no specific request or testimony on the part of the Defendant
requesting that life insurance be maintained, and there existed no
basis for the award.

The order that Plaintiff maintain life

insurance naming Defendant as the beneficiary was an abuse of the
court's discretion and in error.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION RE: CHILD
CUSTODY.

Subsequent to the time of trial and on or about April 17,
1992, Plaintiff filed a Verified Motion to Withdraw Stipulation of
Plaintiff (Addendum "G").

The basis of the motion was that the

premises upon which the Stipulation to Custody were based, were
found to be inaccurate premises in that subsequent to trial, the
Defendant, who suffers from bipolar manic depression, was behaving
in an irrational fashion, preventing visitation, verbally abusing
Plaintiff's new spouse, and unnecessarily

and

inappropriately

involving the children in the difficulties between Plaintiff and
Defendant.

That motion specifically outlines the behavior and

basis for the motion to set aside the stipulation.
Given the fact that the court had not made its decision on all
other substantive issues, and given the fact that no decision was
made by the court until June, it is obvious, in retrospect, that
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the motion was timely

and, more

importantly, that the best

interests of the minor children were at issue and should have been
addressed.

Utah Code Ann, §30-3-10 specifically states that "the

court shall consider the best interests of the child and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties" in
determining the care and custody of minor children in a divorce
(§30-3-10[l]). Further, that statutory provision goes on to state
that "in awarding custody, the court shall consider, among other
factors the court finds relevant, which parent is most likely to
act in the best interests of the child, including allowing the
child frequent and continuing contact with the non custodial parent
as the court finds appropriate" (§30-3-10[2]). Given the basis for
the Plaintiffs motion, which included Defendant's irrational acts,
irrational behavior in the presence of the children, and her
failure to provide Plaintiff access to the children, it was and
should have been clear at that time that the issue of best
interests should have been addressed by the court.

Our court has

provided us with a number of factors to look at considering and
determining what is in the "best interest" of the children for
custody purposes.

They include the following factors:

The need for stability in custodial relationship and
environment; maintaining an existing primary custodial
bond; the relative strength of parent bonds,
The relative abilities of the parents to provide care,
supervision, and a suitable environment for the children
and to meet the needs of the children;
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Preference of a child able to evaluate the custody
guestion;
The benefits of keeping siblings together, enabling
sibling bonds to form;
The character and emotional stability of the custodian;
and
The desire for custody; the apparent commitment of the
proposed custodian to parenting.
Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990) (See also Hutchison v.
Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1982).
Given the Defendant's psychiatric history and the important
issues raised in Plaintiff's motion, it was an abuse of the court's
discretion to ignore the best interests issue and to not allow the
court to investigate what was and is in the best interests of the
minor children, Erika and Kira. By failing to permit Plaintiff to
set aside the stipulation, the trial court put the Plaintiff in the
position of having to file a Petition for Modification and having
to

overcome

the

substantial

burden

of

changed

circumstances

reguired by the case of Hogge v. Hogge. 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1982).
Further, the case of Maughn v. Mauahn, 770 P. 2d 156 (Utah App.
1989), specifically states "our reading of Hogge and its progeny
suggests that on a petition for custody modification, the trial
court should carefully scrutinize the facts behind the original
award of custody.

If the initial award was based on a thorough

examination by the trial court of the various factors pertaining to
the

child's

welfare, a

rigid

application

of
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the

change

in

circumstances prong is in order."

Maughn at 160.

It is unknown,

given the review of the custody issue and Plaintiff's motion to set
aside his stipulation as to physical custody, whether the court
would then feel it necessary to apply the rigid Hogge standard as
articulated in Maughn or the less rigid standard later adopted in
Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599 (Utah 1989).
Regardless of the burden of proof and burden placed upon
Plaintiff by virtue of the court's failure to set aside his
stipulation regarding physical custody of the children; since the
focus of the court was to have been, and should have been, and
should always be, the best interests of the minor children, the
court abused its discretion in failing to allow Plaintiff to
withdraw the stipulation and look into the issue of best interests
of Kira and Erika.
V.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN THE AWARD
OF ALIMONY.

The Plaintiff was 36 (thirty six) years of age at the time of
trial (Financial Declaration, Index 104). Defendant was 35 (thirty
five) years of age at the date of trial (Financial Declaration,
Index 119). While the parties had been married for, approximately,
14 (fourteen) years, Defendant was still youthful, engaged in a
course of education, attending school in a part-time fashion and
would obtain her Masters in Early Childhood Special Education
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within five (5) years of the time of trial attending school parttime. (See TR, p. 155, 11. 3-16.) Given the ages of the children
at the time of trial, of ten (10) and five (5) (TR, p. 4, 11. 1-4),
there was

no

apparent

constraint

prohibiting

Defendant

from

attending school full time and thus completing her educational
process in a much shorter period.
Regardless, Defendant indicated that her mental infirmity did
not prohibit her

from continuing

her educational

process or

functioning as a mother and single parent (TR, p. 148, 11. 14-20,
p. 186, 1. 25, p. 187, 11. 1-7).
Based upon the age of the Defendant and her ability to attain
a Masters Degree in five (5) years or less, it was obvious to the
court that she had no mental or physical infirmity or family
obligation which would

prohibit her

from obtaining

work and

entering the work force within a reasonable period of time.
Based upon all of those facts and circumstances, the trial
court

certainly

did

not

abuse

its

discretion

in

awarding

rehabilitative alimony.
It is well settled and established law in the State of Utah
that

a trial

court

must

consider

the

three

prong

test

determining an award of alimony:
1.

the financial conditions and needs of the wife;
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in

2.

the ability of the wife to produce a sufficient

income for herself; and
3.

the ability of the husband to provide support.

See Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985).

In the instant

case, the trial court fairly and reasonably considered each of
those fators.

The court awarded $1,500.00 (One Thousand Five

Hundred Dollars) per month in alimony, $1,361.00 (One Thousand
Three Hundred Sixty One Dollars) in child support and $200.00 (Two
Hundred Dollars) per month (the "Troy Receivable") for a total
monthly income to her of $3,061.00 (Three Thousand Sixty One
Dollars), for a period of two years, to reduce to $2,561.00 (Two
Thousand Five Hundred Sixty One Dollars) at the end of that twoyear period and for an additional 24 (twenty four) months.
As indicated, the Defendant, though unemployed, and though her
children were school age, was voluntarily attending school only
part-time.
anticipated

(See TR, p.155, 11. 3-7.)
that

she would

obtain

Attending part-time, it was
her

degree

in

Elementary

Education with a Teaching Certificate within three (3) years,
attending part-time.

It was fair for the court to consider her

ability to actually attend full-time and to give her incentive to
complete her educational process by reducing the alimony after a
period of two (2) years, at which point in time she could complete
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a Bachelors Degree with a Degree in Elementary Education, and
commence employment or part-time employment•
The terminable alimony is appropriate in this case and has
certainly been found to be reasonable in other cases of a like
length marriage.

In Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530 (Utah

App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals upheld an award of alimony of
$150.00 (One Hundred Fifty Dollars) per month for five (5) years7
duration after a marriage of 14 (fourteen) years.

Again, in the

case of Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 6 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme
Court found that a 24 (twenty four) month award of alimony after a
nine (9) year marriage was not an abuse of discretion.
The amount of alimony awarded was fair and equitable, given
the fact that the Defendant's total income for the first two (2)
years after the entry of the Decree would be $3,061.00 (Three
Thousand Sixty One Dollars).

Defendant testified to monthly

expenses of $3,198.00 (Three Thousand One Hundred Ninety Eight
Dollars) per month.

It is obvious that her request for $2,000.00

(Two Thousand Dollars) per month alimony was more than her monthly
expenses justified.

The Plaintiff testified that the Defendant's

monthly expenses were inflated, as well, and that Defendant's real
monthly expenses were $2,556.00 (Two Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Six Dollars) (TR, p. 23, 11. 8-25), which expenses were contained
in Plaintiff's Exhibit "6", attached hereto as Addendum "I".
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It is evident from the testimony adduced by Plaintiff and by
Defendant's own exhibit, that she did not need the alimony that she
requested, and that the award of alimony more than paid her monthly
needs and expenses.
Defendant has asserted that the award of alimony should
equalize the parties' respective post-divorce living standards. As
set forth above, the award that the court made was sufficient to
meet the Defendant's monthly needs as articulated at the time of
trial, both by Defendant, although somewhat inflated, and by
Plaintiff and his exhibit provided to the court.

The Plaintiff

disagrees that the award of alimony should equalize the parties'
income, however, footnote 3 of the case of Howells v. Howells, 806
P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991), reads as follows:
Exact mathematical equality of income is not required,
but sufficient parity to allow both parties to be on an
equal footing financially as of the time of divorce is
required. That is what has occurred in the instant case.
Based upon the facts and circumstances of this case, and a
relatively

short

term

marriage,

age

of

the

Defendant, her

proceeding through school, and the substantial income that would
come to her through the award of alimony, child support and the
receipt of the "Troy Receivable," the award of alimony made by the
court, and the declining award and the term of that alimony is fair
and equitable and should be affirmed by this court.

Even if the

court finds that there were not sufficient findings made as to the
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issue of alimony, the court need not reverse, and can sustain and
affirm the trial court's findings, as the record is clear and
uncontroverted

that

the

award

of

alimony

in

this

case

is

appropriate, and the court applied the Jones factors, articulated
above.
VI.

(See Asper v. Asper. 753 P.2d 978, 981 (Utah App. 1988.)
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION OR ERR IN
THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.

At the time of trial, the Defendant testified that she had
paid attorney's fees and that the initial $1,500.00 (One Thousand
Five Hundred Dollars) that she had advanced were from joint funds
of both parties.

(TR, p. 171, 11. 3-11.) Defendant acknowledges

that $1,500.00 (One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars) should not be
considered as part of the requested award of attorney's fees as it
was from joint funds.

The Defendant also testified that she had

savings and testified as follows:
Q

Other than your reserves and savings, do you

have any funds to pay your attorney's fees?
A

No.

Q

You don't desire to invade those funds do you?

A

No, I don't.

TR, p. 171, 11. 15-19.
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It is obvious to each of us that we would prefer not invading
savings to pay bills and debts.

However, the court ordered the

Plaintiff to pay all marital debts and the Defendant was left with
no marital debts, but her ongoing monthly expenses.

In addition,

the court awarded her one-half of the retirement and she had
already been awarded more than one-half of the proceeds from the
sale of the marital residence.

The court also awarded her the

"Troy Receivable" which had a value of $14,500.00
Thousand Five Hundred Dollars).

(Fourteen

The Defendant did not establish,

nor was there any evidence, that Plaintiff had any savings or funds
available with which to pay attorney's fees or costs.

The fact

that Defendant received more than one-half of the marital assets
and received a total award of monthly income from alimony, child
support and the receivable of $3,061.00 (Three Thousand Sixty One
Dollar), was certainly considered by the court in the appropriate
level or need for attorney's fees.

The Defendant simply did not

establish a need to have her fees paid.

The simple fact that she

was unemployed was not sufficient as, after the payment of alimony
and child support and receipt of the marital assets and estate, she
was on an equal footing with Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff disputes

Defendant's allegation that there was any uncontroverted evidence
or evidence at all that the Defendant had a need for financial
assistance in her attorney's fees.
33
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In addition, there was no evidence

in the record

that

indicated that the Plaintiff had the ability to pay attorney's
fees.
Lastly, the testimony of Defendant's counsel did not permit
the court to establish, with any specificity, what the exact fees
were.

In fact, Defendant's counsel testified that "this has not

been an exceptionally difficult case other than the fact that there
were numerous bank accounts which required discovery . . . the
reasonableness amount of fees would be $4,300.00 as of the end of
trial today."

(TR, p. 201, 11. 15-24.)

Upon question, the

Defendant's counsel stated as follows:
MS. WILLIAMS
MR. FANKHAUSER

I would ask if you have a statement?
I don't have a total.

I have been

sending her periodic statements and I have a ledger
statement.
MS.

I can prepare one if the court desires.

WILLIAMS

I would

ask

if

there

were

earlier

representations that there was a bill owing at the time of the
pre-trial of $300.00, a bill owing to you at the time of pretrial?
MR. FANKHAUSER I don't know if that was the amount.
I would check again on the ledger.

I would have to look

and see how much was charged back against the $1,500.00,
plus whatever costs incurred.

I can't tell you exactly.
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MS. WILLIAMS

No questions.

TR, p. 202, 11. 6-20.
It was evident from the cross-examination of Defendant's
counsel that he was uncertain as to the exact bill.

He merely

testified that he thought that $4,300.00 (Four Thousand Three
Hundred Dollars) was a reasonable fee.

He did not state that was

his bill, he had no bill to present to the court, and he could not
identify what his bill was at any particular time.

There was not

sufficient evidence presented to the court to establish what the
reasonable fees were, or even to establish what the fees were.
While Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 (1989) provides that the court can
order either party to pay attorney's fees incurred, "before a court
will award attorney's fees, the trial court must find that the
requesting party is in need of financial assistance and that the
fees requested are reasonable." (See Osguthorpe v. Qsauthorper 804
P.2d 530 [Utah App. 1990] citing Bagshaw v. Bagshawr 788 P.2d 1057,
1061 [Utah App. 1990].)

Again, the Defendant failed both in her

direct testimony to establish need, and in the testimony of her
counsel to establish what the actual fee was. The case of Muir v.
Muir. 841 P. 2d 736 (Utah App. 1991) cited by Defendant is not
applicable to the case at hand, as that case required undisputed
evidence of the reasonable of the requested attorney's fees and the
needs

of

the

individual

requesting

the

same.
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Again,

the

Defendant's counsel was unclear in his testimony as to the actual
fees incurred and what was a reasonable

fee.

In addition,

Defendant failed completely to show that she was in need of a
contribution to her attorney's fees or in any different position or
situation than was the Plaintiff, after the division of the marital
estate and award of alimony and support.
Based upon the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial
court's award of attorney's fees should be affirmed or the court
should enter its own order, ordering that each party should pay his
or her own attorney's fees.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this court should affirm the trial
court's determination regarding alimony and attorney's fees.

The

orders of the court that Plaintiff pay one-half of the cost of
private schooling and maintain life insurance naming Defendant as
beneficiary should be reversed. This matter should be remanded to
the trial court for the entry of a judgment and a second amended
decree for a redistribution of the marital debts and obligations
and a reconsideration of the issue of best interests of the minor
children Kira and Erika, and in whose physical custody they should
be

placed.

Further,

it

is

reasonable

that
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each

party

be

responsible for his or her own court costs and attorney's fees on
appeal.
(W^X

Respectfully submitted this

da^ of May, 1993.

KEJJLiV f. WILLIAMS
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I, KELLIE F. WILLIAMS, hereby certify that two copies of the
foregoing

Appellee's

Brief,

were

HAND

DELIVERED

to

E.

H.

Fankhauser, 243 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah_84111, this
^

day of May, 1993.

Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH,
SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT
and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Civil No.

914902308DA

MARY E. RANDOLPH,

Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendant.

THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED MATTER having come on regularly for trial
before the above-entitled Court on March 24, 1992, at the
10:00 o'clock

a.m., the Honorable James S. Sawaya, District Court

Judge presiding, and the plaintiff
being

hour of

represented

defendant

being

counsel,

E. H.

by

being

present

counsel, Kellie

present

in

person

Fankhauser,

and

F.

and

the

person and

Williams, and

being

court

in

represented

having

heard

the
by
the

testimony of the parties, and having received exhibits, and having
the taken

the matter under advisement, and a bifurcated Decree of

Divorce being previously entered on
court

having

issued

it's

February

findings

counsel on June 22, 1992, at

and

the hour

18, 1992, and the

order

to the parties'

of 11:30

a.m., and based

thereon, the court now makes and enters the following:
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1.

There

have

marriage, namely:

been

Kira

two

A.

children

Randolph,

born as issue of this

whose

date

of

birth is

December 15, 1981; and, Erika C. Randolph, whose date of birth is
June 2, 1986.
awarded

the

The defendant
permanent

is a

physical

fit and

and

proper person

legal

to be

care, custody, and

control of said minor children.
2.

It is reasonable that the plaintiff be awarded visitation

with the minor children as follows:
a.

Alternate weekends

from Friday

at 6:00 p.m. until

Sunday at 6:00 p.m.
b.

Midweek visits, each Wednesday from 5:30

p.m. until

8:30 p.m.
c.

Christmas visitation on Christmas Day, beginning at

1:00 p.m. and continuing

for a

period equal

to one-half

of the

children's total school vacation.
d.

Thanksgiving

visitation

Thanksgiving visitation

shall

until

p.m.

Sunday

which Easter

at

6:00

holiday shall

commence

in

even

Wednesday

years, which
at

6:00 p.m.

and Easter visitation in odd years,

be defined

as from

Friday from 6:00

p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.
e.

The parties shall alternate the other holidays, and

plaintiff shall
Day, Martin

have alternate

Luther King

holiday visitation

on New Year's

Day, President's Day, Memorial Day, July

4th, July 24th, and Labor Day.

The

visitation shall

begin 6:00

000243
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p.m. the

day before the holiday until 6:00 p.n; on the day of the

holiday.

f.

Holiday

visitations

take

precedence

over weekend

visitation and no changes shall be made to the regular rotation of
the alternating weekend schedule.
g.

On

Father's

Day

from

6:00

p.m.

the

day before

Father's Day until 6:00 p.m. the day of Father's Day.
h.

One evening

from 5:30

p.m. until 8:30 p.m. during

the week each child's birthday and the plaintiff's birthday.
i.
weeks.

Summer visitation

Plaintiff is

defendant by May 1.
holiday and
party

be

possession of

The

allowed

above.

four continuous

defendant shall
during that

two

weeks

per

have alternate weekend
period.
year

However, each

of uninterrupted

the children for the purposes of vacation, provided

that the same does
forth

period of

to provide written notice of those dates to

phone visitation

shall

for a

not interfere

Each

notice of that two

party

week

with holiday

visitation as set

shall provide the other, in writing,

period

at

least

thirty

(30) days in

advance.
j.

Should either or both of the children be involved in

year-round school, then plaintiff

shall have

visitation for two

two

notice

those dates to the

week

defendant

periods, with
at

least

written

thirty

(30) days

of

prior

to

visitation.

Defendant would then have holiday and phone visitation during that
time.

G002.49

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4.
support,

The plaintiff,
shall

in addition

reimburse

to the

defendant

foregoing base child

one-half

of

all

day care

expenses paid by defendant while defendant is working or attending
classes, at

an accredited educational institution.

expense attendant to the

day

care

ceases

to

be

If any actual
incurred, the

plaintiff may suspend making monthly payment of that expense while
it is not being incurred without
child support order.
ercent, or
rhrough high

one-half

obtaining a

modification of the

Further, each party is ordered to pay fifty
of

the

costs

of

private

school tuition

school, which sum shall be in addition to base child

4

ouo2:>o
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6.

Plaintiff

parties' children

should
as

be

awarded

dependents

the

for

the

right to claim the
purposes

of

the

calculation of his state and federal income tax deductions.
7.

Plaintiff shall continue to maintain health insurance for

the benefit
through
child.

of the

his

minor children

employment, during

Any insurance premium

minor children

the

costs

and attributable

of the

parties, as available

period of minority of each

paid

to the

by

plaintiff

minor children, shall be

deductible from base child support pursuant to statute.
shall

pay

all

routine office
prescriptions.

routine

medical

visits, physical
The parties

and

for the

Defendant

dental expenses, including

examinations, immunizations, and

will share

non-routine expenses not

covered by insurance, with plaintiff paying

60% of

that cost and

full force

and effect, a

defendant paying 40%.
8.

Plaintiff should

maintain in

policy of insurance on his life, having a benefit payable on death
in the

minimum sum of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00),

with the parties7 minor children named as beneficiaries

until the

children have attained the age of eighteen (18) years or graduated
from high school in due course, whichever last

occurs. Further,

s
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plaintiff should

maintain in

full force

insurance on his life, having a
minimum sum
the period

and effect, a policy of

benefit payable

on death

in the

of One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000.00), during
in which

alimony is

paid by

plaintiff to defendant.

The defendant should be named as the beneficiary thereof until the
termination of alimony.
9.

The bonds previously

should be

held in

purchased

for

the

minor children

a formal trust agreement for the education and

benefit of the minor

children,

and

preserved

and

utilized for

their education and benefit.
10.

Based upon

lack of income on

the current income of the plaintiff and the

the

part

of

defendant,

and

based

upon the

defendant's pursuit of an educational degree, and the prior health
conditions of
support

the

herself

defendant,

at

the

end

and
of

reasonable, necessary, and proper
to

defendant

at

the

rate

($1,500.00) per month for a
commencing June 1, 1992.
the sum of One
additional

Thousand

twenty-four

defendant's
that

ability

educational

that the

to then

term, it is

plaintiff pay alimony

of One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars
period

of

twenty-four

(24) months,

Thereafter, the alimony shall reduce to
Dollars

($1,000.00)

months.

At

the

per

end

month

for an

of the four year

period, the alimony should terminate.

Further, the alimony should

terminate

defendant,

upon

the

death

of

the

or

defendant's

remarriage or cohabitation, whichever first occurs.

000202
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11.
their

The personal property

marriage, and

prior

divided one-half to each.

of

the

parties

acquired during

to the parties/ separation should be

The parties should toss a coin, and the

party winning the coin toss, should choose the first item, and the
parties

should

then

personal property

alternate

item until

and

take

turns

choosing

each

all items of personalty acquired by

the parties during their marriage are divided, one-half to each.
12.

Plaintiff

should

be

awarded

his

Ford

Explorer and

defendant should be awarded her Dodge Caravan.
13.

The parties have previously divided all marital banking

accounts, and each party should be awarded any

monies or accounts

currently in his or her own name.
14.

The parties real property has previously been sold, and

the proceeds divided.
known as

the Troy

However, there

also exists

a receivable,

House receivable, which should

be awarded to

defendant for her additional support.

The defendant

should also

be awarded one-half of all monies received by the parties from the
Troy House receivable, since the parties7 separation.
15.

That the costs of the storage

previously stored,
divided

one-half

and until
to

each,

of the

the property
and

personal property

is divided, should be

defendant

should

receive

no

reimbursement for the costs previously withheld by plaintiff.
16.

Each party should be awarded one-half of the plaintiff's

IRA, 4OIK, ASARCO

retirement,

and

Kennecott

retirement,

as of

March 24, 1992. Any necessary Qualified Domestic Relations Orders
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should issue to divide those funds.
17.

Plaintiff should pay the

debts and

obligation owing to

Redi Credit and the 1991 tax obligation.
18.

Defendant should have her maiden name returned, and she

should be known hereafter as "Mary E. Fox."
19.
Dollars

Plaintiff should
($1,000.00)

to

contribute
defendant's

the

sum

of

attorney's

One Thousand

fees

and costs

incurred in this matter.
20.

Each party

documents to

should

transfer the

execute

and

deliver

any necessary

title and ownership of the property of

the parties pursuant to the decree entered in this action.
BASED UPON the foregoing

findings

of

fact,

the

court now

makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The parties have previously been divorced by a Decree of

Divorce dated February 18, 1992.
2.

A supplemental

Decree of

Divorce should

be granted in

conformance with the foregoing Findings of Fact.
DATED THIS

day of

/$/7SA,4SG>

^~~

JAMES S. SAWAYA
District Court Judge

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

/ 1992.

Approved as to form and content:

EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER
Attorney for Defendant
DATED:
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I

HEREBY

CERTIFY

that

I

am

employed

in

the offices of

Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein,
I caused

and that

the foregoing Supplemental Findings of Fact to be served

upon defendant by placing a true and correct

copy of

the same in

an envelope addressed to:
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER
Attorney for Defendant
243 East 400 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

on the

n
I

day of

WWAMkD/\^/

, 1992.

i|WV\7
Secretary
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KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH,
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE

Plaintiff,
-vs-

Civil NO.

MARY E. RANDOLPH,

Judge James S. Sawaya

914902308DA

Defendant.

THE

3/ 7^/S^

ABOVE-CAPTIONED

MATTER

having

come

trial before the above-entitled

Court on

hour

the

of

10:00

o'clock

a.m.,

on

regularly for

March 24, 1992, at the

Honorable

James

S. Sawaya,

District Court Judge presiding, and the plaintiff being present in
person and

being represented

by counsel, Kellie F. Williams, and

the defendant being present in
counsel,

E. H.

Fankhauser,

person
and

the

and

being

court

represented by

having

heard

the

testimony of the parties, and having received exhibits, and having
taken

the matter

under

advisement,

Divorce being previously entered on
court

having

issued

it's

and a bifurcated Decree of

February

findings

and

18, 1992, and the

order

to the parties'

counsel on June 22, 1992, at the hour of 11:30 a.m.; and the court
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having heretofore

rendered it's

Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law; now, therefore, and for good cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Defendant is

hereby awarded

the permanent

physical and

legal care, custody, and control of the parties7 minor children.
2.

Plaintiff

is

hereby awarded visitation with the minor

children of the parties as follows:
a.

Alternate weekends

from Friday

at 6:00

p.m. until

Sunday at 6:00 p.m.
b.

Midweek visits, each Wednesday from 5:30 p.m. until

8:30 p.m.
c.
1:00 p.m.

Christmas visitation on Christmas

and continuing

for a

period equal

Day, beginning at
to one-half of the

children's total school vacation.
d.

Thanksgiving

Thanksgiving

visitation

until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.
which Easter

visitation

shall
and

holiday shall

in

commence
Easter

even

years, which

Wednesday

visitation

be defined

as from

at 6:00 p.m.
in

odd years,

Friday from 6:00

p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m.
e.

The parties shall alternate the other

plaintiff shall

have alternate

holiday visitation

Day, Martin Luther King Day, President's
4th, July

24th, and

Labor Day.

holidays, and
on New Year's

Day, Memorial

Day, July

The visitation shall begin 6:00

p.m. the day before the holiday until 6:00 p.m. on the day
holiday.
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f•

Holiday

visitations

take precedence over weekend

visitation and no changes shall be made to the regular rotation of
the alternating weekend schedule.
g.

On

Father's

Day

from

6:00

p.m. the day before

Father's Day until 6:00 p.m. the day of Father's Day.
h.

One evening

from 5:30

p.m. until

8:30 p.m. during

the week each child's birthday and the plaintiff's birthday.
i.
weeks.

Summer visitation

period of four continuous

Plaintiff is to provide written notice

defendant by

May 1.

The

shall

be

allowed

of those

during that

two

weeks

period.

per

year

possession of the children for the purposes of
that the

same does

forth above.
notice

of

not interfere

Each party

that

two

dates to

defendant shall have alternate weekend

holiday and phone visitation
party

for a

shall

week

However, each

of uninterrupted

vacation, provided

with holiday visitation as set

provide

period

at

the

other,

in writing,

least thirty (30) days in

advance.
j.

Should either or both of the children be involved in

year-round school,

then plaintiff

two week periods, with
defendant

at

least

written

thirty

shall have
notice

of

(30) days

visitation for two

those

prior

dates

to

to the

visitation.

Defendant would then have holiday and phone visitation during that
time.
k.

Reasonable telephonic visitation before 8:00 p.m.

1.

Other times as agreed by the parties.
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3.
the

Plaintiff is ordered to pay child support to defendant at

rate

of

($1,361.00)

One

per

Thousand

month, which

children attain the age of
plaintiff is

ordered to

care expenses paid by
attending classes,
any

actual

Three

support

eighteen

Sixty-One

defendant

Dollars

shall continue until the

(18) years.

reimburse defendant

at an

expense

Hundred

while

In addition,

one-half of all day

defendant

is working or

accredited educational institution.

attendant

to

the

day

care

ceases

If

to be

incurred, the plaintiff may suspend making monthly payment of that
expense

while

it

is

not

being

incurred

modification of the child support order.
pay one-half

of the

cost of

without

obtaining a

Each party is ordered to

private school

tuition through the

children's high school education.
4.

Defendant

is

entitled to mandatory income withholding

pursuant to Utah Code Annotated. Section 62A-11-401, et.

seq., if

plaintiff falls in arrears in his child support obligation.
5.

Plaintiff

is

hereby

parties' minor children as

awarded

dependents

the

for

right to claim the

the

purposes

of the

calculation of his state and federal income tax deductions.
6.

Plaintiff

insurance for the
through
child.

his

is

ordered

benefit

employment,

of

minor children

the

during

Any insurance premium

to

minor

the

costs

and attributable

continue to maintain health
children

as available

period of minority of each

paid

to the

by

plaintiff

for the

minor children, shall be

deductible from base child support pursuant to statute.
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Defendant

r, i \ A O r f\

is

ordered

including

to

all

routine

immunizations,
share

pay

office

and

non-routine

routine

medical

visits,

prescriptions.
expenses

not

and

dental expenses,

physical
The

examinations,

parties are ordered to

covered

by

insurance, with

plaintiff paying 60% of that cost and defendant paying 40%.
7.

Plaintiff is ordered to maintain in full force and effect

a policy of insurance on his life having a benefit
death,

in

the

($100,000.00),

minimum
naming

sum
the

of

minor

One

Hundred

children

payable on his

Thousand

of

the

Dollars

parties

as

beneficiaries until the children have attained the age of 18 years
or graduated
occurs.

from

high

Further, the

school

plaintiff is

force and effect, a policy
benefit
Thousand

payable

on

Dollars

in

of

death

due

ordered to

insurance

in

the

($100,000.00),

course, whichever last
maintain in full

on

his

life

minimum

sum

of One Hundred

with

the

defendant

having a

named

as

beneficiary thereof, which policy shall remain in effect until the
termination of alimony.
8.

The bonds previously purchased for the minor children are

ordered to

be held

in a formal trust agreement for the education

and benefit of the minor children

and preserved

and utilized for

their education and benefit.
9.

Plaintiff is

ordered to pay alimony to defendant at the

rate of One Thousand Five Hundred
for a

Dollars ($1,500.00)

per month,

period of Twenty-Four (24) months, commencing June 1, 1992.

Thereafter, the alimony shall

reduce to

the sum
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of One Thousand

Dollars ($1,000.00)
months.

At

the

terminate, or

per montn, for an additional Twenty-Four (24)

t.ad

upon

of
the

the

four

death

of

year
the

period,

alimony shall

defendant,

defendant's

remarriage, or cohabitation, whichever first occurs.
10.
their

The personal property

marriage,

and

prior

divided one-half to each.
and the

of

to

the

parties

acquired during

the parties7 separation shall be

The parties are ordered to toss a coin,

party winning the coin toss should choose the first item,

and the parties shall then alternate and take
personal property

item until

turns choosing each

all items of personalty acquired by

the parties are divided.
11.

Plaintiff

is

hereby

awarded

his

Ford

Explorer and

defendant is hereby her Dodge Caravan.
12.

Each

party

is

awarded

any other monies or accounts

currently held in his or her name.
13.

Defendant is hereby awarded the Troy House receivable.

14.

Each party is ordered

ongoing

costs

of

the

storage

to pay
of

one-half of

the past and

the personal property of the

parties.
15.

Each party is awarded

one-half of

the plaintiff's IRA,

401K, ASARCO retirement, and Kennecott retirement from the date of
the parties marriage and up until March 24, 1992.
Qualified Domestic

Relations Orders

shall issue

Any necessary
to divide those

funds.
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16.

Plaintiff is ordered to pay the Redi Credit debt and the

1991 tax obligation.
17.

Plaintiff

($1,000.00) to

is

ordered

defendant

for

to

her

pay

One

Thousand Dollars

attorney's

fees

and

costs

incurred in this matter.
18.

Defendant is

hereby restored

her maiden

name, and she

shall be known hereafter as "Mary E. Fox."
19.

Each party is hereby ordered to execute and deliver any

necessary documents to transfer the
property of

the parties

title

pursuant to

and

ownership

the Decree

of the

entered in this

action.
DATED THIS 2/

^ d a y of

1992.

JA6ES S. SAWAYA
District Court Judge

Approved as to form and content:

EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER
Attorney for Defendant
DATED:
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I

HEREBY

CERTIFY

that

I

am

employed

in

the offices of

Corporon & Williams, attorneys for the plaintiff herein,

and that

I caused the foregoing Supplemental Decree of Divorce to be served
upon defendant by placing a true and correct

copy of

the same in

an envelope addressed to:
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER
Attorney for Defendant
243 East 400 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on t h e

1I

day of

J^iAH(\Aa

w

, 1992.

#kr%\Mtsfop.Wa^>
Secretary

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A:\Aor;.'5

A D D E N D U M

" G "

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Baxr NoT*
Attorney:for- Defendant
243 East 400 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 534-1148

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

*

MARCUS P. RANDOLPH,
ORDER ON COMMISSIONER'S
RECOMMENDATIONS

Plaintiff,

Civil No. 914902308 DA
Judge Sawaya

vs.
MARY E. RANDOLPH,
*

Defendant.

Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Withdraw Stipulation, Motion to
Strike and Motion to Enforce Visitation came on for hearing at a
regular term of the above entitled Court, pursuant to Notice, May
29, 1992 before Domestic Relations Commissioner, Sandra N. Peuler.
Plaintiff was present in person and represented by his Attorney,
Kelly F. Williams. Defendant was present in person and represented
by her Attorney, E. H. Fankhauser. The Court, having received the
proffers of testimony and arguments of counsel, took the matter
under advisement.

The Domestic Relations Commissioner, after

000227
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premises, made recommendations pursuant to written Minute Entry
dated June 4, 1990, to-wit:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff's Motion to Strike having been withdrawn by

Plaintiff, no recommendation is entered thereon and the Motion to
Strike is stricken.
2.

The Plaintiff's Motion to Withdraw his Stipulation to

Custody should be denied.

Although no ruling has been issued by

the Court from the trial held in this matter, evidence on all
disputed matters has been received by the trial Judge. Plaintiff's
Motion is therefore untimely.

In addition, Plaintiff's Motion is

prejudicial to the Defendant, who relied on the Stipulation for
Custody in preparing and presenting her case at trial.
3. Pending a ruling by the Trial Court on Plaintiff's request
for summer visitation, the Plaintiff should be awarded thirty (30)
continuous days of summer visitation, consistent with the Temporary
Order entered in this matter. Consistent with Plaintiff's request,
the visitation should commence on June 13, 1992.
4. Both parties should be and are hereby enjoined from making
derogatory remarks about the other in the presence of the children
and both parties should be enjoined and are hereby enjoined from

2
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DATED this

lay of June, 1992.

BY THE O

.JAMAS' S. SAWAYA
STRICT JUDGE
APPROVED:

Q3s^^d^JkJ^(txJU^—
SANDRA N. PEULER
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSIONER

Pursuant to Article 4 "DOMESTIC RELATIONS" Section 6-401(2)
(E), Utah Code of Judicial Administration, each party shall have
ten (10) days from the date of the recommended Order made by Minute
Entry

to

file written

objections

thereto;

and

further,

the

recommendations of the Commissioner shall be in effect as an Order.

000229
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MMLINGrCERTIFTCATR

KW&VZ&

tfr

I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed
to Kellie F. Williams, Attorney for Plaintiff, 310 South Main
Street, Suite 1400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 in accordance with
Rule 4.504(2), Code of Judicial Administration, on this
of June, 1992.

4

000250
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A D D E N D U M

" D "

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•LAINTirra
EXHIBIT

KELLIE F. WILLIAMS #3493
Attorney for Plaintiff
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
310 South Main Street
Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 328-1162

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH,
Plaintiff,

CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION
WORKSHEET (Sole Custody)

-vs-

Case No. 914902308

MARY E. RANDOLPH,

Judge James S. Sawaya

Defendant.

BASE AWARD CALCULATION:
Number of Children
Gross Monthly Income
Previously Ordered & Paid Alimony
Previously Ordered Child Support
Present Family Obligation
Adjusted Gross Monthly Income
Base Combined Child Support Obligation
Proportionate Share
Share of Base Child Support
Children's Portion of Medical and
Dental Insurance Premiums
Day Care Expenses
BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD
ADJUSTED BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD

Mot h e r

Father

0
0

$9,542

$
$

$

0
n/a

$

0

$

$
$
$

$

0

0
0
n/a

$9,542

$

9,542

$

1,361

$

0

100%

0%
$

Coni b i n e d
2

$1,361
$

—

$1,361
$1,361

Howard W.Support
Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Adjusted Digitized
Baseby the
Child
Award
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Per Child
$ 681
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MONTHLY EXPENSES
Defendant, Mary Randolph and 2 minor children

Rent

750.00

Renter's Insurance

20.00

Food and household supplies
(average $125.00 per week)

540.00

Utilities

75.00

Telephone

50.00

Laundry and cleaning

50.00

Clothing

150.00

Medical/Defendant's therapy & medication
(not covered by insurance)

200.00

Dental

(*)

50.00

Insurance - Medical Premiums (COBRA)

138.00

Child care (1/2 of $260 average)

130.00

School - Private school for children
Books, etc. - Cosgriff

140.00

Entertainment, travel, recreation

200.00

Incidentals (grooming, gifts, etc)

161.00

Auto expense (estimated)

150.00

Other Expenses
Defendant's College - U of U
Newspaper
Magazines

394.00
368.00
16.00
10.00

TOTAL
(*)

$ 3,198.00

Summer camp $650.00 each child
8 weeks comparable to child care
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MARCUS P. RANDOLPH v. HART E. RANDOLPH
Civil No. 914902308DA
AT.T.nrATTON OF EARNINGS / PLAINTIFF'S INCOME
$114,500

Plaintiff's Gross Annual Income

Less Personal Exemption

2,050

Taxable Annual Income

$ 99,

Estimated Annual Federal and State
Income Tax ($99,250 x .35)

)

$ 34,738

Annual FICA and Medicare
Total Annual Deductions

(S 39.839)

NET ANNUAL INCOME

$ 59,411

Annual Debts and Child Support :
Child Support ($1,361 per month)
« 16,332
Zions Bank / car loan ($648 per month)
7,776
Zions Bank / overdraft ($250 per month)
3,000
Support

$ 27,108

Net Annual Income
(after payment of alimony @ $l,100/mo)
Less Total Annual Debts and Child Support

$ 59,411._„
•$ 27,108.00

Actual Annual Income Available to Plaintiff

$ 32,303.00

Actual Monthly Income Available to Plaintiff

$

Monthly Income Available to Defendant;
Alimony
Child Support
Receivable

$1,100
$1,361
$ 200
$2,661
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH.
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH,
VERIFIED MOTION TO WITHDRAW
STIPULATION OF PLAINTIFF

Plaintiff,

Civil No.

-vsMAR1 E

914902308DA

Judge James S. Sawaya

RANDOLPH,

Defendant.

COMES
Williams,

NMW riH'i
.pursuant

Administration
enter

PliAINTTKF
- ;.

^

lereby

I "V

<-.•

nd

-- UJ

moves

.•

^

tlirouqh c o u n s e l ,
nl

the
ff

.•*

^ie

above-entitlea

Kel _e r .
Judicial
cour*.

t<
. :) v

to the issue of custody In the above captioned matter.
SAID MOTION is made for the following reasons:
1.

That

the plaintiff

ori gl nal l/y

I iled

a Compla i jit.

loi

Divorce requesting custody of the parties' two minor children,
Ki ra,

whose dat .e c if bi rth i s December 5, 1981, and Erika, whose

date of birth is June 2, 1 986.

Prior to an evaluation being

completed

his

the

plaintiff

withdrew

request

for custody

and

stipulated at I.he t imo uf ti ial that defendant may be awarded the

»'««U»u»!.»U-p.lHJ.UI,ail<|

-' m- a; •.*".wwjiaBayp8

<***tm-..l.t?Ti*~.
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his r request forr custody*; and- entered into the stipulation based
upon faulty premises.

One premise was that the defendant, who

has previously been involuntarily hospitalized for her mental
illness, had stabilized with medication and was able to care
adequately for the children.
defendant,

who,

except

for

A second premise was that the
Christmas,

had

been

permitting

visitation, would not inhibit visitation between the plaintiff
and the minor children.

Thirdly, the stipulation was premised

upon the fact that the plaintiff had formed a new relationship
with a woman, to whom he is now married, and with whom the
children were not acquainted and plaintiff was concerned that it
would be difficult for the children to bond with a step-mother,
under the circumstances.
2.

The defendant suffers from an incurable mental illness

that is currently being treated with Lithium Carbonate.

Her

symptoms have included irrational acts, an inability to make
decisions,

and

paranoia.

While

the

defendant

is

under

prescription for Lithium, plaintiff understands that if she does
not continue to take it on a regular basis, it will bring on
another episode.
Defendant's first episode occurred in the middle of January
1990.

At that time, she became deeply religious and began

attending mass at least once a day, spent large quantities of
money on religious ornaments, ignored the children and her family
responsibilities and became very difficult to communicate with.

2
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Her conditior

^grsened-. until IFeforuaxyiwhen she- began psychiatric

counseling.

The recommendation w a s that she be committed t o a

psychiatric hospital

-

and w a s .ulim i ! 1 fill
in

February.

Hospital

and! released

:i n Belmont, Massachusetts,

nh

manic,

- .. w^eK*,

later,.

She was diagnosed

antipsychotics,t reatmenl

voluntarily consented » re 1 un; I, an t ly,

treated

with

H e r ongoing

up/in i :eJ ease was to continue monthly sessions with a

psychiatrist, take daily medication of Lithium, avoid stress iiniiJ
get a

r sleep.

D< .

second manic episode occurred In February 1991,

after siu began experimenting with reduced dosage
The

defendant

discontinued

c

taking

manic
•«

lithium.

thyroid medication, called Synthroid.
threateni-

-

and

completely

;u:t

taking her

*

.-*:

P-

SI i€ began skipping her psychiatric counseling

March 18, without warning,
having

*

:J£ 1 i th i urn

left

without

1 1 a I iiti f :f k as

;

* drove :

)enver *.v. • :, vie uiiii

n,

it>* children.

packinc

• : >nt acted by defendant s family, who asked

that

plaintiff pick up defendant immediately because her cone
upsetting -i ister w h o was then ei ght months pregnant , Plaintiff
n r> h i.s i amily.

went
Lake City, defendant
several

nights

immediately left

Ln a women's

she .-

Upon returning t- Sa ; t
i_ ie household
^ -

one o: - -i minor

"-hi 1 a r^it, i • " MI II i ng s h e w a s afraid : c> : :• home b e c a u s e
w o u l d beat h e r

"1 1 lat : 1 las never occurred.

^ t

S h e refused

plaintiff
I: :x> b e

admitted to t h e hospi ta ] , I: i i t: agreed t o a c o u n s e l i n g session w i t h
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Western

Institute

several days.

of Neuropsychology

and remained

there

for

During that time she refused all medication.

Further, while she was at Western Institute she was evaluated by
two psychiatrists, both of whom recommended that she be required
to

submit

to

a

competency

hearing.

The

bases

for

that

recommendation included a physical attack on her doctor and the
hospital staff, an attempt to light a garbage can on fire, her
continual refusal to take medication and physical violence which
required her to be placed in physical restraints and isolation.
On April 5, after a hearing before the Third District Court
Mental Health Commissioner, defendant was involuntarily committed
to the psychiatric ward at the University of Utah Hospital for a
period of 30 days. Upon first being committed and despite a court
order to force medication upon her, defendant refused medication
and was required to be restrained and injected with Haldol.
After a period of approximately one week she recommenced taking
Lithium and was subsequently released.
3.
divorce

The parties were divorced pursuant to a bifurcated
proceeding

plaintiff

introduced

on

February

18, 1992.

Thereafter,

the

the children to his now wife and made

defendant aware of the expected permanency of that relationship.
This matter proceeded to a trial, including testimony, on March
24, 1992.
4.
concerns

By the time of the trial, the plaintiff began having
regarding

the

defendant's

mental

health

and

her

0U01G3
4
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the

child ion.

I o

L)ui»

regarding

custody,

children

but

t h«

plaintiff

was

silent

stipulation

IH'PVIOILS

pursued

joint

regarding

legaJ

physical

entered

into

iufoluily ml
custody

1 lie

of

the

i "h i hirer!.
5

Since

the

parties'

divorce

and

since

the

defendan

d i s c o v e r y t h a t t h e p l a i n t i f f had a new r e l a t i o n s h i p w h i c h has n o w
resulted

i n ma rr i age,,, the

difficult

and irrational

!

iefenciam

Plaintiff b e l i e v e s t h a t

is iiiiwii 1 I! i nq lu accept

the

prevent

defendant

is

s p o u s e , Lee,

defendant

attempting

to

lo

Defendant

has

children

denied

thereby

- . -

everything

plaintiff

requiring

developing

•

1 .he ch :i 1 d r e n from being w i t h p l a i n t i f f .

w i t h the m i n o r

the

the fact that the c h i l d r e n are

a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h plaintiIf's
that

1: las b e e n b e c o m e i iicreasingly

she

can

For example:

visitation

plaintiff

ri gh ts

to o b t a i n

a

court ordei
:•
plaintiff

D e f e n d a n t has failed to h a v e t h e c h i l d r e n r e a d y

at

J

^

agreed

whei i pi •

time

and

r eq ui i: ed

has

to

failed

returi I

to

I: he

be

at

her

ch I M r e m ,

for
home

I, hereby

c a u s i n g d i s t r e s s to the m inor c h i l d r e n .
c
plaintiff,
and

iiinl his

thereby

examplef
plaintiff
you

Defendant

have

in

wih1,

causing

defendant
front

ittie

has r e p e a t e d l y

has

the

in

1 h«j prest'iici1 ot

children

made

and

sisters

5

distress.

statements

such

as,

all

abusive

:

t ln,» minor <.1iiJ«

emotional

derogatory

of the chi ] d r e n

brothers

been verbally

t

i
about

'"'" •-

over

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

South

America?

0U01G4

she give good blow jobs?"

Additionally, defendant recently left

a message on plaintiff's telephone answering machine laughing and
calling plaintiff's wife "plain and uncouth".
be heard protesting
defendant

left

in the background.

insulting

messages

on

The children can

On other occasions
plaintiff's

answering

machine while the children could be heard protesting in the
background.
d.

Defendant

has

required

the

minor

child

Kira

Randolph to attend counseling sessions, over Kira's objection,
stating

that

Kira

must

go

because

of

plaintiff's

new

relationship.
e.

Defendant has caused the minor children emotional

distress by threatening to cut off plaintiff's visitation rights.
The minor child Kira has discussed her distress about not having
enough time with her

father and with her counselor and her

father.
f.

Defendant

has stated that she will not allow

visitation if plaintiff or his wife discuss visitation or custody
issues with the minor child Kira.
g.

Defendant has told the minor children that she will

move the Denver, Coloradof

so that

"I can have you all to

myself," and to make visitation with plaintiff as difficult as
possible.

This has upset the minor children.
h.

Defendant has repeatedly acted in a manner to

intentionally upset the minor children when plaintiff picks them
6
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answer!
6.

The

defendant 5

minor

continuing

Both chile

, ^ *_*.,. * . *<* x#i-f^
beei 1 greatly upset

'n-'-srchildren have*
antagonistic

and

*

irrational

by

behavior.

ut; • neir mother wil 1 keep

them from their father.
Plaintiff has observed the minor children in'leiaif
• riren are
affectionate with plaintiff's wife.
expressed

plaintiff,

and

very

ci 1 'i

comfortable

and

The minor children have

-

*

.

emen t: a nd

happiness ,,«,.,-;, plaintili ' s recent marriage and have stated that
they are giacl to have Lee as part of their family.
8.

The plaintiff dud his- > urrwnl spouse, Lee, who married

April III, have discussed the situation and have agreed that: it is
in the best

interest

custody

of t he children that plainti f f reqiiest
.,

P l a int. i 11 be i I eves that defendant is

not mentally or emotionally stable and that she Is unable to
control her emotions i n dealing with her ourrofil r i re uiiistd rices,
which

rest i i «••; in emotnuwti

addition,

i he defendant

plaintiff

from

having

will

regular

distress

to

the children.

continue

to attempt

anu

In

prevent
:1 the

children.
9.

Plaintiff believes that the children are being harmed,

emotionally, by the irrational.
defendant.

'

mania of the

Plaintili. firmly believes that there should be a

7
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in

this

matter,

including

psychological evaluations, and that this Court should have an
opportunity

to

make

a

determination

as

to

the

appropriate

placement of the children and what is in the children's best
interest.
10.

While conducting a custody evaluation and pursuing the

custody action will require an additional court proceeding, it
will not negate or invalidate the trial previously held relating
to financial and property issues.

Therefore, the defendant will

not have been harmed by the previous trial proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff

respectfully

requests

that

the

Court permit him to withdraw his stipulation to physical custody
in defendant, and that he be permitted to move the Court for a
custody evaluation and to proceed accordingly.
DATED THIS

/ L^

day of

1992.

^ ft N. ^CORPORON & WILLiUMS
//

//

(i

(

, KELLIE F. WILLIAMS
/ Attorney for Plaintiff

0U01G7
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STATB OF*
COUNTY OF

: ss.
„„. )

_ _ _ _

MARCUS

RANDOLPH, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes

and states as follows:
captioned

* ***?

•VJf"* *^ * >rwrT T

U T A H T ^ ^ ^

*^-

• «-

- plaintiff
*

mattorr
* Plaintiff,

Withdraw Stipulatior
contents thereof,

and that

tic » foregoing

and that

the same

to the aboveMotion to

he understands the

is true of his nwn personal

UninwJedqe, except as to those matters stated upon

information and

belief, and as to those matters, he believes the same to be true.

A7c^

A> Jfcdfa
P

MARCUS P. RANDOLPH
Plaintiff /

DATED:

ON TI1K

I (jp (Jay o f
Ni'1

appeared b M ore
the

signer

of

the

4f/6/?

kp.'.0undersigned notary,

foregoing

., 1 99,',

|'er'u»n.i I I

MARCUS P

RANDOLPH,

MOTION TO WITHDRAW STIPULATION OF

PLAINTIFF, who duly acknowledged

to ITH « th.it he .iqneii the same

vi i J ant ar j J J- and for its stated purpose.

Cp*£frvO

NOWflmueuc

..STRATTON
SbHttfUtt

NOTARY MJBLX1

R e s i d i n q ^ W b G l hf' ( CLJLQ.^

County

My Commission Expires:

Hmm
oooi ns
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'CORKTXWHEREBY

CERTIFY that
that

Corporon

&

T =™
,
m
*
employed

" V
in the offices of

willies, attorneys for the plaintiff herein, and that

caused the foregoing VERIFIED MOTION TO WITHDRAW STIPULATION OF
— I F F

to

served upon defendant

be

by

placing

." ^

^

correct copy of the same in an envelope addressed to:
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER
o ? r n e v f o r Defendant
243 East 400 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
-

-—it*,

t h e

in

the

oT1 T
on the

jj"

day

s a n e

of

,

s e a l e d

,

w l t h

f i r s t

_

c i a s s

ed tes maii at sait

T r
4pr,

1992.

j

p o s t a g e

«»— —
--^

Secretary

0G01C0
10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<?\ D D E N D I

IIMI

"I 1 "

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

C. CPR-DR 3-102 Violations
Gillingham next contends that the trial
court erred in concluding that his agreement to divide fees with Jennings was an
impermissible fee-splitting agreement. He
argues that attorneys may disburse fees
paid by their clients as they choose, and
further points out that AFR 9(c)(2) permits
payment of Rule 9 interns. He reasons
that APR 9(c)(2) would be abrogated if
iividing a contingent fee with a Rule 9
intern constituted impermissible fee-splitting.
DR 3-102 prohibits a lawyer from sharing fees with a noulawyer except under
certain narrow exceptions. The purpose of
his rule is to prevent the possibility of
rontrol of a lawyer by a nonlawyer. See C.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics 510 (1986).
)u its face, the rule does prohibit dividing
'ees with a Rule 9 intern, since Rule 9
nterns are "nonlawyers."
^ A l t h o u g h the issue presented here is an
mportant one not yet decided by our
ourts, it has not been adequately briefed
>y either party. Thus, because as disussed below, we need not resolve this
ssue in deciding this appeal, we decline to
lecide whether I)R 3-102 prohibits sharing
ees with a Rule 9 intern.
I).

Damages

(4J Gillingham contends that even if
baring his contingent fee with Jennings
id constitute impermissible fee splitting,
he trial court erred in concluding both that
he fee splitting affected his representation
f the plaintiffs and that there was resultnt damage to them. We agree.
The trial court found that the plaintiffs
fere damaged, reasoning that "disclosure
D [the trial judge of) the true rate paid to
Ir. Jennings more probably than not
wuld have resulted in [the trial judge]
warding greater attorneys' fees to the
laintiff
than
were
otherwise obl i n e d . . . . " The court then reduced Gilligham's contingent fee by 25 percent,
his was based on the court's determinaon that "each plaintiff on a more probable
ian not basis could have received a sum
jual to a $2f>-30/hr. charge for Mr. Jen-

nings' services instead of an award based
on $20/hr."
When courts are measuring contract
damages, uncertainty as to the extent or
amount of damages will not preclude recovery of damages where (here is no uncertainty as to the existence of damage or an
to causation.
Jacqueline's
Washington,
Inc. v. Mercantile Stores Co., Inc., 80
Wash.2d 784, 786, 498 F\2d 870 (1972). The
trial judge in the plaintiffs' original action
based the award of attorneys' fees on Gillingham's fee affidavit. It is undisputed
that this affidavit set forth a reasonable
hourly rate for the services of the Rule 9
intern at $20 per hour and accurately set
forth his true hours. The trial court here
determined that the trial judge in the previous action would have accepted a higher
hourly rate. Because there was no evidence to support this determination, it was
purely speculative.
|r,mlu sum, there is nothing in the record to
support the court's conclusion that the later division of fees was the proximate
cause of any harm to plaintiffs, nor any
evidence of what damage amount might
have been sustained. Gillingham's decision
to share a portion of his fee appears only
to have diminished Gillingham's share of
attorneys fees. We therefore hold that the
trial court erred in reducing Gillingham's
contingent fee by an additional 25 percent
In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's
allocation of the court-awarded attorneys'
fees and computation of the contingent fee
but reverse the reduction of the contingent
fee by an additional 25 percent.
GROSSE, Acting C.J., and BAKER, J.,
concur.
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j ^ I n re The MARRIAGE O F Laura Lclia
STERN, Respondent,
and
Harold Loyd Singleton, Appellant.
No. 22733-5-1.
Court of Appeals of Washington,
Division 1.
April 30. 1990.
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to have been made in error.
10.4(c).

RAP 10.3(g),

3. Appeal and Error <S=»762, 766
Appellate court considered appeal on
the merits, despite fact that appellant did
not set forth verbatim findings and conclusions in his opening brief, where appellant
cured the defect in his reply brief, and
appellee offered no evidence suggesting
she had been prejudiced by appellant's error. RAF 1.2(b), 10.3(g), 10.4(c), 18.9.
•I. Divorce €=»164
The courts' powers in a proceeding to
modify a decree of dissolution are limited
to those which may be inferred from a
broad interpretation of the legislation that
governs the proceeding.

Former wife brought motion* to modify
decree of dissolution, seeking sole legal and
residential custody of children. The Superior Court, King County, Robert Dixon, J.,
entered a decree of modification in favor of
wife. Former husband appealed. The 5. Infants c= 19.3(5)
Court of Appeals, Baker, J., held that: (1)
Failure by trial court to make findings
trial court finding that joint custodial ar- that reflect application of each statutorily
rangement was not harmful as it existed relevant factor in a proceeding to modify a
prior to spanking incident was supported custody award is error. West's RCWA
hy the evidence, (2) trial court finding that 2(i.09.2(;o.
joint custodial arrangement was no longer
6. Divorce <^3()3(8)
workable was supported by the evidence,
Trial court finding determined that
and (3) grant of income-proportionate contribution to childrens' private education ex- joint custodial arrangement was not harmpenses was not supported by the evidence. ful only as it existed prior to former husband's spanking of daughter, despite fact
Affirmed in part, reversed and re- that finding stated that "custodial arrangemanded in part.
ment established by decree of dissolution"
was not harmful to the children, where
other findings of fact and conclusions of
I. Appeal and Error <s=>766
law confined "not harmful" language in
The appropriate! remedy for noncomplifinding to period between entry of original
ance with rule which requires a party to set
decree
and spanking incident.
West's
out material portions of challenged finding
in its brief or an appendix thereto is sanc- RCWA 20.09.200 et seq., 20.09.2GO.
tions, which may include a refusal to con- 7. Parent and Child <3=>2(18)
While parental fitness is a primary
sider the claimed errors. RAF 10.3(g), 10.concern of the court when considering mod4(c).
ification of residential and legal custody, in
2. Appeal and Error <S=740(2), 758.3(9)
a joint custody situation the court must be
The intended purpose of the rules equally mindful of the joint custodial enviwhich require separate assignments of er- ronment and whether changed circumstancror for each challenged finding, and require es have rendered joint custody unworkable
party to set out material portions of chal- and detrimental.
lenged finding in his brief or an appendix
8. Divorce <s=303(7)
thereto, is to add order to and expedite
Trial court finding that joint custodial
appellate procedure by eliminating the lasituation was unworkable and detrimental
borious task of searching through the
to children was supported by the evidence,
record for such matters as findings claimed
and thus trial court order modifying custo-
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dy to establish sole legal and residential
custody in mother was affirmed, even
though both parties were fit and able parents, where relationship between parties
decayed so that children's well-being was
at risk, father's spanking of child had left
large bruise, father had used a favorite
stuffed animal to wipe up urine, and reports of social worker and child psychiatrist indicated that children's care was negatively impacted by differences between
parents and that joint parenting was an
unworkable option.
9. Parent and Child <s=>2(!8)
Parental fitness is just one part of the
analysis when considering modification of
child custody in a joint custody situation.
West's RCWA 26.09.2G0.
10. Parent and Child ®=>3.3(10)
Court of Appeals will not substitute its
own judgment for that of the trial court in
awarding child support where the record
shows that the trial court considered all
relevant factors and the award was not
unreasonable under the circumstances.
11. Divorce «s=>3<KJ(7)
Trial court order requiring former husband to make income-proportionate contribution to private educational expenses of
children was not supported by the evidence,
where there were no findings regarding
need for private education, no showing of a
want of availability of public schooling, and
only testimony regarding comparative educational costs was that at time eldest child
was in kindergarten and attending school
half days it was economically practical to
place child in full-day private school program.
12. Parent and Child e=>3.1(12)
There is no per se prohibition against
award of private school tuition for a minor
child.
13. Parent and Child «=>3.1(12)
Where acceptable public schools are
available, and there is no showing of special circumstances justifying the need for
private school education, the noncustodial
parent should not be obligated to pay for

the private education of his or her minor
children.
14. Divorce <3=>312.7
Remand was required to determine
costs and attorney fees appropriate to be
awarded to former wife on former husband's appeal, in action brought by wife
seeking modification of joint custodial decree, in which mother had been granted
sole legal and residential custody of two
children, even though husband's appeal
was neither frivolous nor devoid of merit;
record was lacking sufficient evidence as to
relative needs and abilities of the parties.
West's RCWA 2G.09.140.

jrjwDavid .!. Ordell, Seattle, for appellant.
Lowell Halverson, Halverson & Strong,
Seattle, for respondent.
RAKKR, Judge.
Harold Loyd Singleton appeals from an
order modifying a decree of dissolution and
awarding sole legal and residential custody
of his two children to his former wife,
Laura Lelia Stern. Two primary issues are
raised on appeal: (1) was modification of
the parties' original joint custody arrangement sufficiently supported by the findings
of fact, and (2) was Singleton properly ordered to pay aii_[7ii!tin('oine-proportionate
share of the minor children*' private school
education expenses. Stern challenges the
adequacy of Singleton's appeal on procedural grounds and seeks attorney fees.
1.

FACTS

The parties had been married for 6 years
when their marriage was dissolved in 1986.
By agreement, the decree of dissolution
established joint legal and residential custody of the two children, who are now aged 6
and 8. During the first year after the
decree, residential custody was to alternate
quarterly between the parties, with the
noncustodial parent having liberal rights of
visitation. This arrangement functioned
smoothly for approximately (> months.
In March 1987, Stern noticed a large
bruise on the younger daughter's bottom.

IN RE MAKKIA<;K OF STKRN
Cl«ca«789 P.2d 807 (Wi.sh.App. I«>90)

„ - i •learned
She questioned the elder child1 ami
that the younger daughter had been
spanked by her father. She also learned
that the father had used a favorite stuffed
animal to wipe up urine from the floor
after the younger daughter had wet herself.

Wash.

809
thereto. The appropriate remedy for noncompliance is sanctions, which may include
a refusal to consider the claimed errors.
See Thomas i>. French, 99 Wash.2d 95, 100,
<i.r>9 P.2d 1097 (1983).

| 2 , 3 | The intended purpose of these
Stern confronted Singleton, and lie adrules is lo add order to and expedite appelmitted both incidents occurred. During lalate procedure by eliminating the laborious
ter counselling, he also disclosed two previ- task of searching through the record for
ous incidents in which (he stuffed toy was such matters as findings claimed to have
used similarly as a method of toilet train- been made in error. Sec French, at 100,
ing. Singleton assured Stern that such
<;.r>9 1*2(1 1097. While appellant did not set
incidents would not recur. He subsequent- forth verbatim findings and conclusions in
ly enrolled in and completed both parenting his opening brief, he cured this defect in
and anger management classes.
his reply brief, obviating any potential inconvenience to this court. Moreover, Stern
The March incident precipitated a period
offers no evidence suggesting that she has
of vigorous antagonism and noncooperation
been prejudiced in any way by appellant's
between the parties. (Ultimately, Stern
brought this action to modify the decree, error. Thus, in the exercise of this court's
seeking sole legal and residential custody.
discretion, pursuant to RAP 1.2(b) and
Singleton counter-petitioned, asking the
RAP 18.9, we will consider the appeal on
court to award exclusive custody to him
tin; merits. Sanctions are not appropriate.
because the present joint custodial environ- See Wiseman r. Goad if ear Tire & Rubber
ment had become detrimental to the chilCo., 29 Wash.App. 883, 881. (J31 P.2d 976
drens' welfare.
(1981); Minert r. I/arsco Corp., 2(i Wash.
App. 807, 870, (ill P.2d 080 (1980).
A temporary order was entered which
maintained the parties' joint legal custodial
III.
MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY
status but vested residential care of the
children in Stern. After a trial, the court
Singleton contends the trial court erred
entered JTIQH decree of modification in favor
by modifying the custodial provisions of
of Stern. This appeal followed. We affirm
the decree of dissolution without finding
in part, reverse in part, and remand to the that the custodial environment was detrrtrial court for disposition consistent with
mental to_^ n the physical, mental, or emothis opinion.
tional health of the parties' minor children.
We disagree.
II. PROCFDURF
Stern argues this court should not consider the merits of Singleton's appeal because Singleton failed to comply with RAP
10.3(g) and 10.4(c).

I l l Procedures relating to the modification of a decree of dissolution are statutorily prescribed. The courts' powers, therefore, are limited to those which may be
inferred from a broad interpretation of the
legislation that governs the proceeding. In
re Marriage of Soriano, 44 Wash.App.
420, 421, 722 P.2d 132 (1980); A meson v.
A meson, ;W Wash.2d 99, 227 P.2d 1016
(1951).

HI RAP 10.3(g) requires separate assignments of error for each challenged
finding arid further requires that each assignment include reference to the finding
by number. RAP 10.4(c) requires a p«rty
to set out the material portions of the chalRCW 20.09.200 ' sets forth the criteria
lenged finding in its brief or an appendix
for modification of custody awards and provides in relevant part that:

f. In 1987 die legislature amended former RCW
26.09.260. However, because (he entry of flic
decree of dissolution in the instant case prc-
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elates the amendment, the changes therein are
not applicable to this appeal. See RCW 26.09.907.
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(1) The court shall not modify a prior
custody decree unless it finds, upon the
basis of facts that have arisen since the
prior decree or that were unknown to the
court at the time of the prior decree, that
a change has occurred in the circumstances of the child or his custodian and
that modification is necessary to serve
the best interests of the child. In applying these standards the court shall retain
the custodian established by the prior
decree unless:
(a) The custodian agrees to the modification;
(b) The child has been integrated into
the family of the petitioner with the consent of the custodian; or
(c) The child's present environment is
detrimentiil to his physical, mental, or
emotional health and the harm likely to
be caused by a change of environment is
outweighed by the advantage of a
change to the child.

P.2d 1049 (1982); Roorda, at 851. 611 P.2d
794; Anderson, at 368, 541 P.2d 996.
16J In the instant case, whether or not
the trial court set forth findings which
sufficiently reflect the mandate of RCW
26.09.260 turns largely upon the meaning
of finding of fact 1.12 which provides:
The Court finds that the custodial arrangement established by the Decree of
Dissolution is not harmful to the physical, mental or emotional health of the
children.

Singleton argues that this finding is at
odds with the trial court's decision to
award custody to Stern. He asserts that
finding 1.12 must be read to negate the
requirement that the court find a detriment
as set forth in RCW 26.09.260. This interpretation fails, however, to consider the
context within which the finding was made
and fails to consider the findings in their
entirety. Although finding of fact 1.12
when examined by itself could be read as
an assessment of the joint custodial rela(5J Compliance with these criteria is tionship in the present tense, when the
mandatory. Failure by the trial court to finding is read in context, it is clear that
make findings that reflect the application the trial court was not endorsing the
of each relevant factor is error.
Anderson present state of the joint custodial environv. Anderson, 14 Wash.App. 306, 368, 541 ment.
P.2d 996 (1975), review denied, 86 Wash.2d
It is well established that, the interpreta1009 (1970); In re Marriage of Murray, 28
tion or construction of findings of fact and
Wash.App. 187, 622 P.2d 1288 (1981); In re
conclusions of law presents a question of
Marriage of Raugust, 29 Wash.App. 53,
law for the court. Callan v. Gallon, 2
627 P.2d 558 (1981). In the context of joint
Wash.App. 446, 448, 468 P.2d 456 (1970).
custody, the inquiry under the statute is in
In Callan an action was brought to deterpart whether |7t„>there has been a change in
mine
obligations under a divorce decree.
circumstance of the "joint custodians as
established by the decree". In re Mar- j^iaTlie question presented involved the inriage of Murphy, 48 Wash.App. 196, 198- terpretation of language found in two paragraphs of the decree. This court stated:
99, 737 P.2d 1319 (1987).
The general rules of construction applicaThe primary concern of the courts in
ble to statutes, contracts and other writcustody matters is always the welfare of
ings are used with respect to findings,
the child. In re Rankin, 76 Wash.2d 533,
conclusions and judgment. These rules
537, 458 P.2d 176 (1969).
Custodial
include the rule that the intention of the
changes are viewed as highly disruptive for
court is to be determined from all parts
the children. In re Marriage of Roorda,
of the instrument, and that the judgment
25 Wash.App. 849, 851, 611 P.2d 794 (1980).
must be read in its entirety and must be
Both statute and case law demonstrate a
construed as a whole so as to give effect
strong presumption in favor of custodial
to every word and part, if possible. The
continuity and against modification. RCW
authorities .. . refer to two canons of
26.09.200 et seq.; In re Marriage of
construction, here particularly pertinent
Thompson, 32 Wash.App. 418, 421, 647
(1) that the court is not confined to ascer-

IN RE MA It KM
AlK OF STFRN
Clle as 789 l'.2<l 80
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taining I he meaning of a single word or
phrase without regard to the entire judgment, and, if necessary, the judgment
roll, and (2) that provisions in a judgment
that are seemingly inconsistent will be
harmonized if possible.
(Citations omitted.) Callan, at 448-49, 468
P. 2d 456. We added "|i)t is not to be
assumed that a court intended to enter a
judgment with contradictory provisions and
thus impair the legal operation and effect
of so formal a document." Callan, at 449,
I6H P.2d 456.

Wash.
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modification of the prior Decree is necessary to serve the best interests of the
children.

Additionally, the court concluded at 1.2:
The conflict between the parents, arising primarily from the clearly excessive
and inappropriate discipline the father
administered to the child, Robin, warrants a change in the custodial relationship between the parents. The harm
that is likely to be caused by perpetuating a clearly unworkable joint custody
arrangement is outweighed by the advanThe trial court's findings of fact are setage to both children to live in a less
quential. They chronicle the significant
conflictual environment. The only manevents and circumstances that led to the
ner in which that can be accomplished is
petition and to the court's disposition. The
by awarding the mother sole custody,
meaning of finding of fact 1.12 is made
both physical and legal.
clear by the next finding. Finding of fact
When finding of fact 1.12 is read in com1.13. which qualifies finding of fact 1.12,
bination with the other findings of fact and
provides:
conclusions of law, Singleton's interpretaAlthough joint, parenting between the
tion does not logically follow. We think a
parents was successful at the beginning
more reasonable interpretation of the findof their divorce, joint custody has not
ing is that the trial court determined the
operated since the spanking incident.
joint
custodial arrangement was not harmThe unequivocal inference is that after
ful only as it existed prior to the spanking
the spanking incident occurred, the joint
iMistodial arrangement had not been suc- incident.
cessful. In our opinion, this finding confines the "not harmful" language in the
finding above to the period between entry
of the original decree and the March incident. It is a statement of past rather than
present condition.
Additionally,
references
are made
throughout the findings mid'conclusions
concerning tlie decline of the custodial |,i (arrangement established by the decree of
dissolution. Finding of fact 1.11 provides
in relevant part:
(Tjhat while both parents are committed,
active and competent parents for their
daughters, the historical and present level of conflict between the parents makes
continuation of the joint custody arrangement unworkable.
At conclusion of law 1.1. the court stated in
relevant part:
The Court is also mindful of RCW 26.09.260 and finds that changes have occurred
in the circumstances of the children and
the Respondent (joint custodian) and that
•'HOPPd- »9
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Singleton further argues that because
the trial court found both parties to be fit
and able parents, and that there existed
little likelihood of a repeat of the incidents
which gave rise to the petition for modification, no detriment to the children's well-being could be found in the original custodial
arrangement. Singleton cites conclusion of
law 1.7 in support:
The court also finds, however, that
both parents would be fit and proper
persons to have custody of their daughters and each would serve their daughters' interests well. Roth parents desire
custody and both would provide visitation to the other. The children's views
arc not able to be considered because
they are so young. However, they are
bonded to both parents and have expressed to others a desire to be with both
parents. They have |7ir,developed significant and important relationships with
both parents and have, apparently, adjusted well with both parents, notwithstanding the conflict between them. The
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between the parents, this recommendation
would be unworkable at the present time."
Parental fitness is but one part of the
analysis when considering modification in a
joint custody situation. In this case, it is
not determinative.
Singleton maintains, however, that even
if we were to affirm the trial court's finding that the conflict and lack of cooperation
between the parents made the joint custodial arrangement unworkable, such a finding
is not a sufficient ground upon which to
modify the decree. We would not readily
countenance a situation where one party
undermined a joint custodial arrangement
(81 In In re Marriage of Murphy, 48
simply by refusing to cooperate, or by
Wash.App. 196, 737 P.2d 1319 (1987), a
claiming an inability to get along with or
substantial change in circumstances was
trust the other party. But that is not the
occasioned by the move of one joint custosituation here. Ample testimony detailed
dial parent to another state. Although the
the parties' history of conflict and the damtrial court specifically found both parents aging change in the joint custodial environwere fit and maintained a good relationship ment as a result of the March incident. In
with their child, it also found that alternat- our opinion, unworkability in this case diing physical custody under the changed
rectly relates to the welfare of the children
conditions, particularly where the child was involved. Changes in the conditions or cirapproaching school age, was not feasible. cumstances between Singleton and Stern
The court therefore determined that the would have been of little moment had they
"present environment" was detrimental to not affected the welfare of the children.
the child. Murphy, at 199, 737 P.2d 1319. The record contains substantial evidence to
(91 Murphy establishes that a finding support the court's finding that the best
of detriment to the child in his or her interests of the children required a change
present environment need not be based in custody. Fairly read, the court's findupon the parenting of either party, but may ings reflect the application of the factors
arise from a change in the joint custodial set forth in RCW 26.09.260. The order
environment. Such is the situation in the modifying custody is affirmed.
instant case. The relationship between the
parties decayed so that the children's wellIV. MODIFICATION OF SUPPORT
being was at risk. Substantial evidence in
As a part of its decree modifying custothe record supports the trial court's deterdy, the trial court modified support. In
mination that the joint custodial arrangement was no longer workable. The trial addition to monthly child support, the order
court had before it the reports of Alice requires appellant to contribute a percent
Probert, a family court services social of the private educational expenses of the
worker, and Dr. Dunne, a court-appointed children. Conclusion of law 3.3 provides as
child psychiatrist. Ms. Probert reported follows:
The parents should contribute to the
"[b]ecause of the high level of conflict and
child care and private education expenses
strong difference, [of opinion about
of their children in the same proportion
management and care of the children] the
and in the same ratio as indicated by
children's care has been impacted negativetheir respective incomes jTppresently 59%
ly. " j m D r . Dunne concluded " . . . thus the
(Respondent) and 41% (Petitioner).
thought [of] joint parenting would be an
There appears to be little difference in
optimal recommendation. However, given
this incremental expense whether the
the historical and present level of conflict

Court finds there' is little likelihood of a
repeat of the incidents giving rise to this
Petition.
|7J Singleton's
argument,
however,
steers wide of the real issue. Certainly,
parental fitness is a primary concern of the
court when considering modification of residential and legal custody. See Anderson,
at 366, 541 P.2d 1)96. In a joint custody
situation, however, the court must be
equally mindful of the "joint custodial environment" and whether changed circumstances have rendered joint custody unworkable and detrimental.
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I'hildren are in day can* or attending
private Catholic school and, indeed, the
schooling expense may be less than maintaining the children in public school and
then having to pay for before and after
school child care.
Singleton assigns error to this finding 2 and
argues it lacks evidentiary support in the
record. We agree.

O l O
,

We have found no cases in Washington
specifically addressing the minor child/private school tuition issue. The case of
Smith r. Pontius, 119 Wash. 211, 205 P.
381 (1922), is, however, factually analogous. In Pontius, the court held that a
divorced husband was not liable to the wife
for expenses in maintaining an insane child
in a private asylum. There, an ex-spouse
"In Washington, findings of fact sup- brought an action seeking reimbursement
ported by substantial evidence will not be for sums expended by her in support and
disturbed on appeal." Bering r. Share, maintenance of the parties' mentally ill
1"6 Wash.2d 212. 220. 721 P.2d 918. (10H6) child. The child was adjudged insane
vert, denied, 479 U.S. 1050, 107 S.Ct. 940, shortly after reaching the age of majority.
93 LKd.2d 990 (1987): Thorndike v. Hespe- At that time he was committed to the stateSeveral
rian Orchards, hie., 54 Wash.2d 570, 575, run institution in Steilacoom.
313 I\2d 183 (1959). If the record contains years later the mother petitioned for the
evidence of "sufficient quantum to per- child's parole. Against the wishes of the
suade a fair-minded, rational person of the father, the petition was granted. Theretruth of a declared premise", substantial after, the mother kept the child in private
evidence exists. /// re Snyder, 85 Wash.2d sanitariums until she was financially no
longer able to do so. The court ruled that
b2. 185-86, 532 l\2d 278 (1975).
where a child had been regularly commit1101 The amount of child support rests ted to a state institution and there was no
in the sound discretion of the trial court. showing that the child was not properly
Tins court will not substitute its own judg- treated while in the s t a t e s care, nor that in
ment for that of the trial court where the a private sanitarium the child would receive
record shows that the trial court considered
better care, it was not necessary to the
all relevant factors and the award is not
child's welfare that he reside in a private
unreasonable under the circumstances. Iu
institution. Thus, the money expended for
rr Marriage of Nicholson, 17 Wash.App.
the child's maintenance was itself not rea110. 119, 561 l\2d 1116 (1977).
sonably necessary and the father was unfill In the instant case, the trial court der no legal obligation to pay. Pontius, at
made its award on the basis that no mea- 213-14. 205 P. 381.
surable difference existed between the
A similar rationale was offered by a Calicosts of day care and private school. The
only testimony regarding comparative edu- fornia court with regard to the noncustodicational costs was that at the time the al parent's obligation to provide for the
eldest child was in kindergarten and at- private education of his or her minor chiltending school half days, it was economical- dren. In /// re Marriage of Aylesworth,
165 Cal.Kptr. 389, 394, 106 Cal.App.3d 869
ly practical to place her in a full-day private
school program because the costs were (1980), the court identified two primary
roughly equaled by the reduced cost of day conditions which must exist prior to an
care. There was no testimony regarding, award for private education expenses:
and it appears that the trial court did not demonstrated need of the child, and the
consider, the tuition and day care cost dif- parent's ability to pay. See Straub v.
ferential when both children were in school Straub, 29 Cal.Rptr. 183, 213 Cal.App.2d
full time. Nor does it jrjxappear that the t ri- 792 (1963). Need may be assessed by deal court considered the need, if any, that the termining whether the child has equal acchildren be placed in a private rather than cess to a publicjTj.iSchool education, and, if
public school.
so. whether due to the peculiar circum2. Although labelled a conclusion of la
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stances of the child it is in his or her "best interests" to instead attend private school.
In Aylesworth, one of the parties' children was epileptic, a condition which prior
to receiving regular medication caused him
to miss significant time from school, and
when in attendance, to be the subject of
ridicule from his classmates. The child
was placed by the mother in a private
school. In upholding the trial court's grant
of tuition costs in favor of the mother, the
appellate court ruled:
[I]t is a legitimate and reasonable inference from respondent's testimony that
the closer pergonal attention afforded
Duke at Crossroads School is of personal
benefit to him in helping to alleviate his
past anxieties related to school, and in
helping him to cope with and adjust to
his need for medication and all the attendant psychological problems accompanying such an illness in a young man.
Moreover, this finding is not inconsistent
with the court's refusal of [the mother's]
request for private tuition for Duke's
sister, Cynthia, who has never attended
private school and shows no need or evidence that such attendance would be of a
more personal benefit to her than it
would be to any child in general.
Aylesivorth,
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165 Cal.Rptr. at 394.

In the case at bench, there are no findings regarding the need for a private education. Nor are there findings that any
benefit shall inure to these children from
attending a private school that will not
inure to them from attending a public one.
The trial court did find that there was
"little difference" between the costs of attending private school full-days and attending public school half-days with the remainder spent in day care. However, no finding
was made comparing the costs of tuition
and day care with both children enrolled in
school full time.
Conspicuously absent from Stern's brief
is any mention of the comparative costs
between public and private schooling with
)r without day care. Stern concedes, how?ver, that with both children in school full
;ime, day care costs will diminish to a frac-
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tion of that required at the time of the
modification.
I no Assuming it to be true that day care
costs with both children in school full time
are nominal, what remains is the cost differential between public and private
schools. Singleton, in his motion for reconsideration before the trial court, set forth a
tuition and day care cost schedule that
plainly evidenced an appreciable difference
in private school expenses over that of
public schools. In the absence of a showing of need or want of availability of public
schooling, no substantial evidence can be
found to support the trial court's award.
As a result, the court exceeded the limits of
its discretion.
[12, 13J There is no per se prohibition
against the award of private school tuition
for a minor child. Factors such as family
tradition, religion, and past attendance at a
private school, among others, may present
legitimate reasons to award private school
tuition expenses in favor of the custodial
parent. However, the court's findings do
not address such circumstances. Where
acceptable public schools an? available, and
there is no showing of special circumstances justifying the need for private school
education, the noncustodial parent should
not be obligated to pay for the private
education of his or her minor children.
The grant of an income-proportionate
contribution to the childrens' private education expenses was error. As to that portion of the court's decree, we reverse.
V.

ATTORNEY FEES

[Ml Stern requests her costs and attorney fees on appeal. This court may award
attorney fees under RCW 20.09.140 after
specifically considering the financial resources of both parties. In re Marriage of
Belsby, 51 Wash.App. 711, 719, 754 P.2d
1209 (1988). We must then balance the
needs of one party against the other party's ability to pay. In re Marriage of
Young, 18 Wash.App. 402, 400, 509 P.2d 70
(1977). Additionally, we may also consider
the merits of the appeal itself.
Chapman
v. Perera, 41 Wash.App. 444, 455-56, 704

I'.2d 1224, review
1020 (1985).

denied, 104 Wash.2d

j^-iContrary to Stern's claim, the appeal was
neither frivolous nor devoid of merit.
However, the record before this court is
lacking sufficient evidence as to the relative needs and abilities of the parties. We
therefore remand this issue to the trial
court to determine whether costs and fees
are appropriate and, if so, in what amount.
WINSOR

WEBSTER, J.J., concur.

57 Wash.App. 6^7
jwwSTATK of Washington, Respondent.
v.
.Icancane WOOIJiRICHT. Petitioner.
No. 2:*955-l-I.
Court of Appeals of Washington.
Division 1.
April ;M, 1990.

Driver, charged with driving while intoxicated, filed motion to dismiss. The District Court granted motion, and State appealed. The Superior Court, King County,
Patricia Aitken. .1.. reversed Seattle District
Court's dismissal, and appeal was taken.
The Court of Appeals, Scholfield, J., held
that: (1) implied consent law did not require that State perforin breathalyzer test,
and (2) failure of trooper to administer
breathalyzer test to driver was not arbitrary action or governmental misconduct
authorizing dismissal of driving while intoxicated charges.

Wash.

815

1990)

by arresting officer or under his supervision.
2. Automobiles e»355(6)
Chemical tests are neither necessary
nor required to prove intoxication for driving while intoxicated purposes.
II. Criminal Law ©=>7O0<9)
State's duty to preserve material evidence for defendant does not require investigating officers to seek out exculpatory
evidence or conduct test to exonerate defendant.
I. Automobiles <3=>II5
Implied consent statute does not require that defendant arrested for driving
while intoxicated be given breathalyzer
test, but merely provides that defendant is
deemed to have given her consent and establishes certain guidelines for testing in
event that test was used or sought to be
used.
5. Automobiles 0=»J15
Defendant charged wiih driving while
intoxicated had right to additional tests administered by qualified person of her own
choosing, where defendant had in fact
agreed to submit to breath test administered by arresting officer, although officer
later determined that working machine was
not available.
(». Automobiles C=>JI5
Failure of trooper to administer
breathalyzer test to driver charged with
driving while intoxicated was not arbitrary
action or governmental misconduct authorizing dismissal of driving while intoxicated
charges; driver did not have right to such
tests, and no test was given because officer
was unable to find functioning machine
after two attempts and driver had been in
custody for lengthy amount of time.

Judgment affirmed.
1. Automobiles e=».|22
Statutory scheme relative to breath
test contains no language which gives suspect right to breath test to be administered
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j ^ Albert A. Rinaldi, Seattle, for Jeaneane
Wo ,l,ri hl
»
« Pamela Mohr, David Rruce, Deputy King
County Prosecutors, Seattle, for State.
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MARCUS P. RANDOLPH vs. HART E. RANDOLPH
Civil No. 914902308DA
DEFENDANT'S MONTHLY EXPENSES
Rent
Food and Household Supplies
Utilities (pays gas only)
Telephone
Laundry and Cleaning
Clothing
Medical Expenses
Dental Expenses (deductible)
Medical Insurance (COBRA)
Child Care ($60/mo, 8 mos/yr)
Cosgriff
Entertainment
Auto Expense
Incidentals
School Expenses
TOTAL

$

750.00
450.00
75.00
40.00
20.00
150.00
98.00
8.00
139.00
40.00
168.00
200.00
80.00
161.00
177.00

$2,556.00

calculations set forth on next page

2

II

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT
.&
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Medical Expenses:
Psychological:
Ben Dobbin (2 @ $60)
Less Insurance Coverage
Paid by Defendant
Miscellaneous:
Less Insurance Coverage
Paid by Defendant

$ 120.00
50%
$

$

60.00

$

8.00

40.00
801

Amortization of Deductible:
$350 : 12

1_

98.00

TOTAL MONTHLY MEDICAL EXPENSES
Cosgriff (as received 10/8 from Rosie):
Kira:
Tuition
Books and Fees

30.00

$ 965.00
125.00
$1,090.00

Erika:

Tuition
Books and Fees

$ 850.00
75.00
$

Total Cosgriff per year
TOTAL COSGRIFF PER MONTH
Incidentals:
Haircuts (1/mo each)
Relatives Gifts (1/mo)
Christmas ($100/girl)
Birthdays ($100/girl)
Family Christmas ($200/year)
Church
Alcohol

$2,015.00
$ 168.00
$

50.00
20.00
17.00
17.00
17.00
20.00
20.00

TOTAL INCIDENTALS PER MONTH
School (University of Utah):
(Based on 12 credit hours per quarter)
In-state full-time tuition
Books
Total Quarterly Expenses
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES

925.00

161.00

$ 557.00/quarter
$ 150.00/quarter
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$
$

707.00
177.00

